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FORCED
MARRIAGE
AND
THE
EXOTICIZATION OF GENDERED HARMS IN
UNITED STATES ASYLUM LAW
This is a pre-publication version which will appear in (2011) 19(3)
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

JENNI MILLBANK* AND CATHERINE DAUVERGNE**
Refugee law scholars and advocates have devoted a great deal of
attention to gender-related persecution since the 1980s. The Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) first
contended that gender was a valid basis for refugee claims in 1985 and
released its original guidelines for the protection of women as refugees in
1991.1 Critical scholarship has focussed on refugee law’s bias towards
recognition of masculinised experiences and on how its categorizations
confine women to narrow, victimized identities.2 After more than twenty
years of concerted effort, one might expect to see an increasingly nuanced
refugee jurisprudence concerning gender. With this in mind, we began a
study of forced marriage as a basis for refugee claims.3
While claims of forced marriage or pressure to marry as the, or a,
main basis of persecution represent only a tiny portion of refugee claims
overall, they provide an illuminating sliver reflecting the major recurring
themes in gender and sexuality claims from recent decades. Forced
marriage is an important case study of gender in refugee law because it
involves longstanding and unambiguous human rights standards, it arises
in diverse settings and the harms associated with it take many forms and
impact differently depending upon the gender and sexuality of those
*
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1

U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Executive Committee Conclusions,
Refugee Women and International Protection, § (K) (18 Oct. 1985), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c43a8.html [hereinafter UNHCR, Refugee Women and
International Protection]; UNHCR, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, U.N.
Doc ES/SCP/67 (1991), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3d4f915e4.html.
2
See, e.g., Deborah Anker, Women Refugees: Forgotten no Longer?, 32 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 771 (1995); Deborah Anker, Lauren Gilbert & Nancy Kelly, Women Whose
Governments are Unable or Unwilling to Provide Reasonable Protection from Domestic
Violence may Qualify as Refugees under United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 709 (1997); Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
25 (1998); THOMAS SPIJKERBOER, GENDER AND REFUGEE STATUS (2000); HEAVEN
CRAWLEY, REFUGEES AND GENDER: LAW AND PROCESS (2001); Karen Musalo & Stephen
Knight, Steps Forward and Steps Back: Uneven Progress in the Law of Social Group and
Gender-Based Claims in the United States, 13 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 51 (2001).
3
As this study draws on an international data set, we use the term “refugee,”
which is defined in international law and is used consistently throughout our case set. The
term “asylum” is perhaps more common in the United States.
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involved. Our examination of these cases reveals the profound schism
between human rights norms and refugee law’s protections.
While we acknowledge that there are many valid criticisms to be
made of international human rights discourse, our analysis in this article
reflects our belief that meaningful consent to marriage is nevertheless a
gendered human rights issue of vital importance. We are also aware of
concern that policymakers and others either completely conflate arranged
and forced marriage or else pose (consensual) “arranged” and “forced”
marriages as if they are diametric opposites; whereas consent to all kinds of
marriages may take place within a continuum of pressure and coercion.4 In
this article we intend “forced marriage” to include any marriage in which
one or both participants have been deprived of the opportunity of free or
meaningful consent through threats, including emotional and economic
threats, pressure or coercion. Our research has affirmed our understanding
that refusal to marry is a flashpoint for expressing non-conformity with
expected gender roles for heterosexual women, lesbians and gay men. We
proceed from the premise that the state has a role in protecting, and indeed
a duty to protect, consent to marriage. This role extends to responding to
claims for assistance from citizens and, in some circumstances, noncitizens.
This paper presents results from our study of 168 refugee decisions
where part of the claim for refugee protection concerned actual or
threatened forced marriage. We gathered every decision available in
English that meets these criteria during the past fifteen years from
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States (the
“receiving countries”).5 In the present discussion, we highlight our findings
from the cases from the United States (American), while detailed findings
regarding the broader international data set are published elsewhere.6
While there are notable differences in the cases arising from each receiving
country we studied, the American cases stand out as a group distinct from
the rest. We found a marked reticence on behalf of American decision
makers to grapple with gendered harms in general and forced marriage in
particular. Where the American cases do analyze harm as gendered, the
discussions are markedly more focused on exoticized elements, such as
foreign cultural practices that tend to distance and objectify women, than
do decisions from other jurisdictions. The American decisions also tend to
describe such practices in prurient detail. Furthermore, the American cases
are notably more insular than those from other countries. Among the fortyeight American decisions in our data set, we did not find a single reference
to a non-American decision or to an international human rights standard.
This may be the norm in American refugee law, but it is certainly not the
global norm and is one of many factors demonstrating that American
asylum law is alarmingly out of step with developments elsewhere.
Our analysis treads a fine line between a temptation to generalize
and the impossibility of doing so. In the United States and the United
4

See, e.g., Sundari Anitha & Aisha Gill, Coercion, Consent and the Forced
Marriage Debate in the UK, 17 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 165 (2009); Anne Phillips & Moira
Dustin, UK Initiatives on Forced Marriage: Regulation, Dialogue and Exit, 52 POL. STUD.
531 (2004).
5

6

We did not find any decisions fitting these criteria from New Zealand.

Catherine Dauvergne & Jenni Millbank, Forced Marriage as Harm in Domestic
and International Law, 73(1) MOD. L. REV. 57 (2010).
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Kingdom in particular, we have access to a very small number of decisions
compared to the total number of refugee determinations made during this
time period. Our American analysis is limited especially by scarce access
to Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decisions. The BIA, the major
refugee decision making agency in the United States, benefits from
considerable legislative and judicial deference. Limited access to these
rulings means a serious lack of transparency in American asylum law. We
have no reason to believe that the decisions we have found are atypical of
American jurisprudence generally, as even in this electronic age it remains
the case that important and leading decisions are reported and that the very
best and very worst of decisions become well known in advocacy circles,
but we cannot be certain. We cannot, of course, draw any quantitative
conclusions about American decision making. We present this analysis for
what it is: a glimpse of what it is currently possible to know about
American refugee decisions regarding forced marriage.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the American decisions against
the comparative backdrop of our international data set. We present this
analysis in four steps. The first section compares recent attention to forced
marriage as a domestic policy issue in European law with fledgling
American developments. The second section outlines the framework of
American asylum law and policy with regard to forced marriage through
the development of gender analysis guidance documents incorporating
international human rights standards. This section also explores the failure
to integrate these standards through case studies of two high-profile cases:
In re Kasinga in 1996 and Gao v. Gonzales in 2007.7 Following this, we
examine how the key requirements of refugee jurisprudence—persecution,
particular social group, and nexus—have been approached in the American
forced marriage cases. Through this examination we compare American
cases with those from the international data set. Finally, we turn to how
successful American claims differ (or not) from successful claims
elsewhere.
I. COMPARING AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN FORCED
MARRIAGE DEVELOPMENTS IN DOMESTIC
IMMIGRATION AND FOREIGN POLICY
Public and political concern over forced marriage emerged in
Europe in the early 1990s, at least a decade before any interest in this issue
developed in the United States. The policy trajectory varied in different
European countries, but in each case it arguably arose from an implicit
understanding of vulnerable brides as “ours” (nationals or dual nationals),
while imposed grooms are “theirs” (migrant spouses). This generated an
intense early focus on immigration restrictions as the “answer” to the
problem of forced marriage.8 This is distinct from the contemporary
American discourse where, by contrast, forced marriage concerns center
almost exclusively upon child marriage, an issue which is presented as
7

In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA June 13, 1996); Gao v. Gonzales, 440
F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2006).
8
The use of immigration restrictions by European countries to address forced
marriage has been strenuously criticised as anti-Muslim, intertwined with the war on terror
and unduly punitive of immigrant women. See, e.g., Sherene Razack, Imperiled Muslim
Women, Dangerous Muslim Men and Civilised Europeans: Legal and Social Responses to
Forced Marriages, 12 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 129 (2004); Amrit Wilson, The Forced
Marriage Debate and the British State, 49 RACE & CLASS 25 (2007).
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being geographically confined to “developing countries.” We will consider
the importance of this contrast after briefly surveying the European
developments.
Of all European countries, Denmark directed its reform energies
concerning forced marriage most explicitly and continuously towards
immigration restriction. Legal changes limiting family reunification
immigration provisions began in Denmark in 1998 and were tightened
again in 2000, 2002 and 2004.9 The impact of such immigration law
changes reached far beyond forced marriages, but were justified on the
basis that the greatest vulnerability was faced by young people with little
independence from their families who were being coerced into marriages
with overseas-born, often older, spouses from the same ethnic background.
Only after most of these restrictive regulations were in place did Denmark
produce an “Action Plan on Forced, Quasi-Forced and Arrangement
Marriages” with proposals for broader empowering strategies such as
counselling, education for teachers and case workers, residential facilities
and a research program.10 In contrast, Norway pursued an inverse
trajectory, beginning in 1998 with an “Action Plan” that did not focus on
immigration restriction (indeed it suggested liberalizing immigration
policies might actually reduce incentives to forced marriage).11 The initial
1998 Norwegian plan focused on education and support for victims.
Immigration law changes were not introduced in Norway until 2003, and
were minimal in comparison with Denmark. In the same year, a specific
criminal provision on forced marriage was introduced in Norway, a move
replicated by Germany in 2005 and Belgium in 2007.12 During the same
time period, France made several changes to procedural requirements to
ensure genuine consent for marriage.13
The United Kingdom provides an interesting example of the
development of a multifaceted approach shaped by community and
feminist involvement. While initial action focused on immigration,
including raising the age requirements for spousal visas, it rapidly moved
in a number of other directions. Rather than criminalization, the United
Kingdom created a range of new civil remedies under the Forced Marriage
(Civil Protection) Act, which passed in 2007 and came into effect in
December 2008.14 The centrepiece of this law is the creation of a “forced
9
Anja Bredal, Tackling Forced Marriage in the Nordic Countries: Between
Women’s Rights and Immigration Control, in ‘HONOUR’: CRIMES, PARADIGMS AND
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 342–45 (Lynn Welchman & Sara Hossain eds., 2005).
10
THE DANISH GOVERNMENT, THE GOVERNMENT’S ACTION PLAN FOR 2003–2005
FORCED, QUASI-FORCED AND ARRANGED MARRIAGES (2003), available at
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/05ED3816-8159-4899-9CBBCDD2D7BF23AE/0
/forced_marriages.pdf.

ON

11

Bredal, supra note 9, at 333–35.

12
Brigitte Clark & Claudina Richard, The Prevention and Prohibition of Forced
Marriages—a Comparative Approach, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 501, 503 (2008).
13

14

Id.

Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act, 2007, c. 20 (U.K.). Scotland recently
introduced similar legislation: see Forced Marriage etc. (Protection and Jurisdiction)
(Scotland) Bill (SP Bill 53) introduced into Scottish Parliament on 29 September 2010,
available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/bills/53-forcedMarriage/b53s3-introdpm.pdf.
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marriage protection order” designed to protect a person at risk of forced
marriage or who has already been forced to marry.15 The legislation creates
a flexible tool and strenuously reinforces a proactive role for the courts in
confronting and potentially averting forced marriage.
A key aspect of the United Kingdom’s approach was the
establishment in 2005 of the Forced Marriage Unit (FMU), a joint initiative
of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office. The FMU
agenda reflects a feminist and community-informed understanding that
forced marriage is a harm based upon power imbalances concerning gender
and sexuality. The Forced Marriage Unit information brochure for the
lesbian and gay community states:
A forced marriage is conducted without the consent of one or
both people, and pressure or abuse is used. This could include
both physical pressure (when someone threatens to or actually
does hurt you) or emotional pressure (for example, when
someone tries to make you feel that your sexuality brings shame
on your family) to get married.16

Policy initiatives include roles for schools and teachers, health care
professionals, social workers, police, community organizations and
individuals in being alert to and responding to situations of forced
marriage. These initiatives articulate a “protective” role of the state that
extends to proactive service provisions. A statutory guidance document
accompanying the new legislation states that in the first nine months of
2008, 1,300 “instances of suspected forced marriage” were reported to the
FMU.17 In terms of ongoing casework, the FMU reports that it currently
deals with around 400 cases annually.18 The FMU has also developed a
unique capacity to act overseas to assist Britons and dual citizens facing
forced marriage. The FMU coordinates with consular staff abroad to
intervene directly when the unit or consular staff are notified that someone
is at risk of forced marriage, or has been forced to marry overseas. By 2008
the unit had reportedly assisted with 180 such cases overseas.19
What the European initiatives have in common, whether anchored
in immigration, criminal or family law, is a central concern about forced
marriages taking place within Europe. The United Kingdom has gone
further than other states by extending this protective concern beyond its
citizens to include even individuals who are not citizens and not being
forcibly married within the United Kingdom, but who are connected to it
only by a residency right.20 Contemporary American concern about forced
15

Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act, supra note 14, at pt. 1.

16

FORCED MARRIAGE UNIT (U.K.), GUIDE TO FORCED MARRIAGE FOR LGBT
PEOPLE 2 (2007), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/foced-marriage-lgbt.
17

HM GOVERNMENT, THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE: MULTI-AGENCY STATUTORY
GUIDANCE FOR DEALING WITH FORCED MARRIAGE 5 (2008), available at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/3849543/forced-marriage-right-to-choose.
18

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Forced Marriage Unit,
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/human-rights/forced-marriage-unit (last visited Feb.
6, 2010).
19
Owen Bowcott & Jenny Percival, Bangladeshi “forced marriage” GP due back
in Britain tomorrow, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2008.
20
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marriage starts from precisely the opposite position. Current initiatives in
the United States are focused on non-citizens located only in so-called
“developing” countries and affected by a “harmful traditional practice.”21
Considering the shape this issue has taken in the domestic policy of the
United States illuminates how the understanding of forced marriage has
been limited, and arguably misunderstood, in American asylum law.
There do not appear to be any domestic non-government
organizations (NGOs) staging campaigns about preventing forced
marriages within the United States, nor is there an academic literature
discussing social, political and legal aspects of forced marriage. In
searching for a domestic discourse about forced marriage within the United
States, we find a domestic politics of concern about child marriage in
foreign countries, as well as a strand of anti-trafficking politics which
considers the linkages between human trafficking and forced marriage, but
only a few very small recent signs that a broader European-style
engagement may be on the horizon.
Concern in the United States about child marriage has crystallized
in proposed legislation under the title International Protecting Girls by
Preventing Child Marriage Act. Parallel bills were introduced into the
House of Representatives and Senate in the spring of 2009.22 The House
passed its version on 10 June 2009.23 The original House and Senate bills
state in their respective “Findings” sections that “child marriage, also
known as ‘forced marriage’ or ‘early marriage’ is a harmful traditional
practice that deprives girls of their dignity and human rights,”24 and is
framed with statistical information regarding child marriage worldwide.25
While girls are named in the bill’s title, child marriage is defined as “the
marriage of a girl or boy, not yet the minimum age for marriage stipulated
in law in the country in which the girl or boy is a resident.”26 The bill
authorizes expenditures for a variety of assistance programs aimed at
reducing and eliminating child marriage and gives priority to areas with a
high occurrence of child marriage, activities that have proven successful,
and pilot projects that agree to share their evaluations. This assistance is to
be coordinated with existing foreign aid initiatives.27 The bill would also

21

International Protecting Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act, H.R. 2103,
111th Cong. (2009) §2 (introduced Apr. 27, 2009); International Protecting Girls by
Preventing Child Marriage Act, S. 987, 111th Cong. (2009) §2 (introduced May 6, 2009).
22

H.R. 2103, supra note 21; S. 987, supra note 21. The bills are identical in
substance but present material in a differing order with the result that section numbers are
not identical.
23
This was passed as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 2010 and 2011, H.R. 2410, 111th Cong. (2009), §1111. In this version of the bill, the
Findings section is eliminated as are some generalized provisions regarding assistance. All
specific requirements were carried forward.
24

H.R. 2103, supra note 21, at §2(1); S. 987, supra note 21, at §2(1).

25
Throughout §2, the global prevalence of child marriage is discussed, eleven
countries in Africa and South Asia are named as particular problem areas, and protection
against forced marriage in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is cited. H.R. 2103,
supra note 21, at §2; S. 987, supra note 21, at §2.
26

H.R. 2103, supra note 21, at §8; S. 987, supra note 21, at §3.

27

H.R. 2103, supra note 21, at §4; S. 987, supra note 21, at §5.
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require the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to develop a multi-year
strategy for confronting child marriage, to develop research capacity
surrounding the issue and to include information about child marriage in
the annual State Department Human Rights Reports.28
It is unknown at the time of writing whether the Bill will become
law in the future.29 The tenor of the legislation is strikingly at odds with our
analysis of American asylum decisions in that it is overtly linked to a
concern over international human rights standards. In part, this disjuncture
may be because it focuses on a distinct subset of the problem of forced
marriage. Addressing only child marriage, only developing countries, only
“traditional practices,” and focusing almost exclusively on girls obviates
the possibility of the kind of robust and wide-ranging discussion taking
place in the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent elsewhere in Europe.
Framed only as an issue of early marriage and the impossibility of consent,
it excludes discussion of how forced marriage may be used to control nonconforming sexuality across a broad range of experiences, including adults
in their twenties, gay men and lesbians and young women choosing
interracial or religious partners. It also excludes discussion of forced
marriage in contexts where the practice is sharply modernized (for example
involving international travel or the theft of the victim’s passport and cell
phone).30 The legislation takes the unnecessary step of pronouncing that
“child marriage” is also known as “forced marriage,” thus defining away
all other aspects of forced marriage.31
The 2009 legislation has its antecedent in a bill co-sponsored by
then-Senator Hillary Clinton in 2006 under the title “International Child
Marriage Prevention and Assistance Act of 2006.”32 This earlier legislation
was similar in its focus on foreign aid initiatives for developing countries,
backed up by strategy development and reporting requirements. The most
significant difference was its focus on the health risks to girls becoming
pregnant and giving birth before adulthood.33 The bill was introduced by
Senator Durbin with a speech on maternal mortality rates.34 Given this
28

H.R. 2103, supra note 21, at §§5–7; S. 987, supra note 21, at §5–7.

29
On December 1, 2010, Senate passed an amended version of the bill, but upon
return to the House it was defeated on December 16, 2010.: see International Protecting
Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act of 2009, S.987, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/legislation.xpd.
30

See, e.g., FORCED MARRIAGE UNIT (U.K.), supra note 16.

31
Although some commentators have made an effort to suggest that the practice
is not solely “foreign” or “other,” it is the “child” element that is seen to occur within the
United States, not the “forced” aspect. That is, while there is some limited recognition that a
significant number of teenagers do marry in the United States, there is not yet any concern
about forced or coerced marriages occurring “at home.” See, e.g., Bojana Stoparic, AntiPoverty Efforts Face Child Marriage Hurdle, WOMEN’S ENEWS, Aug. 22, 2006,
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/ dyn/aid/2831.
32
S. 3651, 109th Cong. (2006). This bill was referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations and then stalled. The other sponsors were Senators Dick Durbin and
Chuck Hagel. See id.
33

A specific aim of the bill was to reduce the global incidence of obstetric fistula.

Id. at §6.
34
Senator Dick Durbin, Remarks introducing the International Child Marriage
Prevention and Assistance Act of 2006 (Dec. 8, 2006), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/R?r109:FLD001:S61684 (follow “MATERNAL MORTALITY--(Senate Dec. 8, 2006)”).
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concern an exclusive focus on girls was logical. The current version of the
legislation focuses more directly on marriage itself, but this antecedent
does help contextualize the emphasis on “child” rather than “forced”
marriage.
The second area where concern about forced marriage arises in
American discourse is in the domain of human trafficking. The United
States has staked out a leadership role in the increasingly globalized effort
to criminalize and eradicate trafficking in persons, and since 2001, the
State Department has issued an annual Trafficking in Persons Report
assessing trafficking prevalence and prevention efforts in countries around
the globe.35 Since its earliest edition, this report has included some
references to women and girls who are trafficked within or across borders
for the purpose of forcible marriage.36 The intensity of the Report’s focus
on forced marriage has increased somewhat since 2001. Given the very
high proportion of Chinese asylum claims in the American data set, it is
apposite to point out that the inaugural 2001 report raised a concern about
women trafficked into China and through China for the purpose of
“arranged marriages.”37 In contrast to the new and fledgling public
discourse about child marriage, public and political attention to the issue of
human trafficking is well established and sustained in the United States.38
Forced marriage does not have a central place in this discourse but it is
recognized as a related issue of concern.
Finally, there are also small snippets of evidence of some
American policies beginning to reflect awareness of how forced marriage
may affect American citizens. The 2005 version of the State Department
Foreign Affairs Manual contains a seven-page chapter addressing forced
marriage.39 This text is distinct from the domestic discourses of child
marriage and trafficking and has similarities with the activities of the
British Forced Marriage Unit. Although the chapter is titled “Forced
Marriage of Minors,” it opens by observing that “[t]he issue of forced
marriages involves more than just child victims,”40 and also states that
fifteen percent of victims are male. The first paragraph concludes with

35

For an overview of this effort, see CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE
ILLEGAL: WHAT GLOBALIZATION MEANS FOR MIGRATION AND LAW 69–92 (2008); James
Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of "Human Trafficking” 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1
(2008).
36

See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TRAFFICKING
(2010), available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
37

IN

PERSONS REPORT

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 37 (2001).

38

See Hathaway, supra note 35. See also Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a
Human Rights Violation: the Complex Intersection of Legal Frameworks for
Conceptualizing and Combating Trafficking, 24 MICH. J. OF INT’L L. 1143 (2003); Janie
Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human
Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437 (2006); Anne Gallagher, Human Rights and the New
UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM.
RTS. Q. 975 (2001); Kara Abramson, Beyond Consent, Toward Safeguarding Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations Trafficking Protocol, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 473
(2003).
39

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL VOLUME 7 – CONSULAR
AFFAIRS (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86822.pdf.
40
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Id. at 1.

strong advice to American diplomats: “Cases involving US citizen/national
children that come to your attention cannot be disregarded, or simply
referred back to their parents. You must take all possible steps to protect
the US citizen/national child in these cases.”41
The chapter then sets out the legal authorities both for
understanding forced marriage as a human rights infringement and for
supporting consular action; distinguishes forced marriage from arranged
marriage (a distinction often disregarded in asylum cases);42 and outlines
specific actions to be taken. American diplomats are not empowered to
confront forced marriage of their citizens as assertively as the British, in
part because of the authority granted by the United Kingdom’s 2008
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act, but they have nonetheless been
given unambiguous guidance about the harm of forced marriage.
This advice appears to have been taken to heart by only one
American embassy in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The embassy website has a
forced marriage page stating:
The U.S. Embassy in Dhaka is willing to assist victims or
potential victims of forced marriage. If you are an American
citizen in Bangladesh, or know an American citizen in
Bangladesh, who has been, is being, or fears being forced into
marriage against your/their will, please contact the U.S.
Embassy in Dhaka 43

The ‘FAQ’ page gives advice to those citizens already in
Bangladesh, to American citizens yet to travel there and to citizens who
have already been forcibly married. The page states that some individuals
may be eligible for loans from the United States government to help them
return to the United States and also advises, “If possible take a cell phone
with you, and have the contact number of the U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh
stored in it.”44 The State Department also includes a warning about forced
marriage as part of its travel advisory for Bangladesh.45 While Bangladesh
41

Id.

42

The chapter states:

Arranged marriages have been a long-standing tradition in many cultures
and countries. The Department respects this tradition, and makes a very
clear distinction between a forced marriage and an arranged marriage. In
arranged marriages the families of both spouses take a leading role in
arranging the marriage but the choice whether to accept the arrangement
remains with the individuals.
Id. at 3-4. Contra Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801, (2007)
(No. 06-1264) (see infra pp. 23–26, where forced marriage is repeatedly characterised as
“arranged.”).
43

Embassy of the United States: Dhaka, Bangladesh, Forced Marriage
Homepage, http://dhaka.usembassy.gov/forced_marriage_home.html (last visited Oct 21,
2010) (emphasis in original).
44

Embassy of the United States: Dhaka, Bangladesh, Forced Marriage FAQ page
http://dhaka.usembassy.gov/forced_marriage_faq.html
45

U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Consular Affairs, Bangladesh Country
Specific Information, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1011.html (last visited
Feb. 19, 2010) (General travel advice regarding forced marriage provides a series of links to
the United Kingdom Forced Marriage Unit webpages).
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is defined by the State Department as a developing country, the concern
about forced marriage is addressed to American citizens with twenty-first
century sensibilities.
In sum, the contrast between American and European approaches
to forced marriage reveals a sustained, broader and more detailed
engagement with this issue in Europe. Within the United States, with the
exception of some isolated references to the possibility of forced marriage
of American citizens abroad in diplomatic and consular materials, the issue
of forced marriage has been subsumed into concerns either about child
marriage taking place in foreign countries, where age is used as a blunt
proxy for consent (and where child pregnancy has been an overwhelming
concern), or about human trafficking with its own strong politic. In this
context, forced marriage is overwhelmed and fails to emerge as a distinct
concern worthy of separate analysis and action.
In the next section, we outline how gender guidance within refugee
policy in the United States has developed to acknowledge forced marriage
as a gendered harm. Yet, through an examination of key cases, we explain
how this policy guidance has in fact been honored far more in the breach
than the observance. We explore how female genital mutilation (“FGM”)
has come to dominate all discussion of gendered persecution in the
American refugee context to the exclusion of other, less exoticized, forms
of gendered harms.
II. FORCED MARRIAGE AS A GENDERED HARM IN
AMERICAN ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY
Nation states implement their obligations under the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter “Refugee
Convention”) differently. At international law, a refugee is someone who:
[O]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.46

On the basis of this definition, international refugee law provides
“surrogate” protection for individuals whose country of nationality cannot
or will not protect them from certain types of harm. It is clear in the
jurisprudence that states are not required to protect their citizens from
every breach of an international human rights standard: some breaches
constitute persecution and others do not.
While the United States is similar to the other countries we discuss
in that it has an onshore adjudication system with limited avenues of
judicial review from initial administrative decisions, there are several
unique features. First, the American system is bifurcated with separate
institutions, processes and evidentiary standards for “affirmative” claims
(those made proactively by the applicant) and “defensive” claims of
46
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150, art. 1(a)(2), amended by Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan.
31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
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asylum, which are made to withhold deportation proceedings.47 Second,
since 1996 there has been a strict statutory requirement of timeliness, with
a one-year period for claims to be made and limited exceptions.48 This is in
contrast to many other countries where a time delay may be taken into
account as adverse to credibility, but does not prevent the claim being
heard on the merits.49 Third, the judicial review structure in the United
States, which has eleven separate numbered federal courts of appeal not
bound by each other’s rulings, has generated a distinctly chaotic approach
to questions of legal interpretation regarding the refugee definition, in
particular on how to approach gender and the definition of “particular
social group”.50 Further, while the interpretation and application of refugee
law is highly politicized in all of the countries under discussion,51 the
United States is unique in its heightened deference to the role of the
Executive in decision-making. So, for example, immigration judges who
find that an applicant has satisfied the legal standard in an affirmative
claim for asylum nevertheless have discretion to deny it.52 In addition, the
Attorney General has the power to issue instructions on legal interpretation
of the relevant provisions and to directly intervene to vacate decisions of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
On the whole, we contend that administrative and statutory
responses to gendered refugee issues in the United States have been marred

47

In an affirmative claim for asylum the applicant must demonstrate the
Convention standard of a “well founded fear” which must be more than a mere possibility
but does not need to meet the balance of probabilities. In a defensive or “withholding of
removal” claim the applicant must show that it is “more likely than not” they will be subject
to persecution. See Deborah Anker, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 15, 19, 77
(3rd ed., 1999); THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY (5th ed., 2003). See also Paul
O’Dwyer, A Well-Founded Fear of Having my Sexual Orientation Asylum Claim Heard in
the Wrong Court, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185 (2008).
48

See Karen Musalo & Marcelle Rice, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies: The
Implementation of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 693
(2008). In our study, see for example, Matter of A-D-A (Bos., MA Immigration Court, Sept.
19, 2005) (on file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies); Xuan Li Zheng
v. Ashcroft, No. 02-73656, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 10776 (9th Cir. June 3, 2002).
49
In addition, since 2005, the REAL ID Act includes a statutory power to make
negative credibility determinations without regard to whether any inconsistency or
inaccuracy is in fact central to the claim. REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)
(2009).
50
See O’Dwyer, supra note 47; Fatma Marouf, The Emerging Importance of
“Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular Social Group” and its Potential Impact on
Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47
(2008).
51
For example, in recent years, as part of a global trend of refugee receiving
nations narrowing eligibility in on-shore claims, Australia amended its legislation to narrow
the definition of persecution, while the United Kingdom and Canada included mandatory
consideration of certain negative credibility factors in their legislation. See Migration Act
1958 (Austl.) section 91R; Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act,
2004 (UK) section 8; Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27 § 106
(Can.).
52

For one example of the effect of this policy, see the comments in Manani v.
Filip, No. 08-1530, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1980, at *3 (8th Cir. Jan. 28, 2009).
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both by delay and a lack of coherence.53 In 2001, then Attorney General
Janet Reno intervened to overturn a 1999 Board of Immigration Appeals
decision that women facing domestic violence could not form a “particular
social group” and proposed new regulations for gender-related claims
under which the case should be decided. When, after six years, these
regulations had still not been finalized, the Department of Homeland
Security submitted a brief to the Attorney General stating that “married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship” should be
recognized as a social group and directed that the BIA should decide the
pending original case on this basis. The regulations still did not eventuate
and in 2008 the Attorney General took the step of lifting the original stay
so that the BIA could itself resolve the issue.54 A 2009 brief by the
Department of Homeland Security in another domestic violence refugee
claim before the BIA, acknowledged the delay of over nine years in
producing regulations on gender but insisted that the Department had not
“abandoned” the effort, and stated that its new leadership (installed as a
result of the Obama Administration) was “considering the best way
forward.”55
In contrast to this extraordinary period of delay and ambivalence
over domestic violence specifically and gender more broadly, the statutory
definition of refugee was amended in 1996 as a result of advocacy by
conservative Christian groups to specifically deem forced abortion and
sterilization persecution on the basis of political opinion.56 The American
statute thereby prioritizes these harms over other forms of gendered
persecution57 and receives very high numbers of claims from China as a
consequence.58
Our research demonstrates that forced marriage is still not widely
accepted in American asylum law as a persecutory harm, which may give
53
For background, see Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Steps Forward and
Steps Back: Uneven Progress in the Law of Social Group and Gender-Based Claims in the
United States, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 51 (2001).
54

Matter of RA, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (BIA 2008); see also Gao v. Gonzales, 440
F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing earlier developments).
55

Supplemental Brief of Department of Homeland Security at 4, n.5, In re L.R.
(Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716asylum-brief.pdf. While the brief has been lauded as “open[ing] the way for foreign women
who are victims of severe domestic beatings and sexual abuse to receive asylum in the
United States,” the brief in fact represents a fairly restrictive approach to domestic violence
and particular social group. The brief maintains the Administration’s refusal to accept
gender more broadly as the basis for a refugee claim. Julia Preston, New Policy Permits
Asylum for Battered Women, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at A1. (LR’s claim ultimately
succeeded in 2010: see Julia Preston, Asylum Granted to Mexican Woman in Case Setting
Standard on Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, August 12, 2010). See further discussion under
“Particular Social Group,” infra note 133.
56

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2009). See also infra note 101.

57

See Matter of Y-T-L, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601 (BIA 2003), discussed in Matter of
A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Attorney Gen. 2008).
58
In 2008 China was the leading country of origin for those receiving grants of
on-shore asylum (encompassing both affirmative claims and withholding of removal) in the
United States, comprising a staggering twenty-four percent of protection grants. See Daniel
Martin & Martin Hoeffer, Dep’t Homeland Sec. & Office Immigr. Stat. Pol’y Directorate,
Refugees and Asylees: 2008, ANN. FLOW REP., June 2009, at 5, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary
/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2008.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
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rise to refugee status. This is particularly shocking given that forced
marriage was explicitly addressed in the 1995 Immigration and
Naturalization Service (“INS”) “Considerations for Asylum Officers
Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women” (hereafter “the INS Gender
Guidelines”).59 In an introductory overview, the Guidelines note that
women claimants may face particular forms of harm for “breaching social
mores” such as “marrying outside of an arranged marriage,”60 and later in
the section on persecution states that forms of harm “that are unique to or
more commonly befall women” include “sexual abuse, rape, infanticide,
genital mutilation, forced marriage, slavery, domestic violence and forced
abortion.”61 Additionally, the INS Gender Guidelines state that “the
evaluation of gender-based claims must be viewed within the framework
provided by existing international human rights instruments and the
interpretation of these instruments by international organizations.”62
The international instruments referenced in the INS Gender
Guidelines include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (“CEDAW”), while the international organizations and
interpretations listed include the original UNHCR Gender Guidelines
(since substantially revised) and the Canadian Gender Guidelines (which
are notably described as “a model for gender-based asylum
adjudications”).63 Current versions of these latter two documents expressly
characterize forced marriage as a form of gender-based persecution.64 The
references to more general international law instruments, the UDHR and
CEDAW, are also significant, as these characterize the choice of whether
and whom, to marry as a fundamental human right. The requirement that
marriage be undertaken only with the “free and full consent” of both
parties first appeared in Article 16(2) of the 1948 UDHR and was later
incorporated in various other U.N. human rights treaties.65 In 1979,
59

Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office Int’l Aff. on Considerations for
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women to All INS Asylum Office/rs &
HQASM Coordinators (May 26, 1995), (reprinted in 7(4) INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 700 (1995))
[hereinafter INS Gender Guidelines].
60

Id. at 4.

61

Id. at 9.

62

Id. at 2.

63

Id. at 2.

64

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, GUIDELINE 4, WOMEN
REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION §§ A.I.4, B (1996). U.N.
High Comm’r for Refugees Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related
Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 36(vii), U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7,
2002) [hereinafter UNHCR, Gender Guidelines] (“Female claimants may also fail to relate
questions that are about ‘torture’ to the types of harm which they fear (such as rape, sexual
abuse, female genital mutilation, ‘honour killings’, forced marriage, etc.).”) See also
UNHCR, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity, ¶¶ 14, 27, 28, (Nov. 21, 2008).
65

The right was reiterated in Article 23(3) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 23(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966 used the more limited language of “free
consent.” International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 10(1), Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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CEDAW Article 16(1)(b) expanded the language of consent to include
“[t]he same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only
with their free and full consent.”66
The 1995 INS Gender Guidelines formed the basis for the 2001
INS “Gender Guidelines for Overseas Refugee Processing.” This later
document restates that forced marriage is a gender-based form of harm
which may be persecution in refugee law.67 In addition, the issue of forced
marriage is dealt with in detail in training materials for immigration
officers produced by the INS: the “Gender-Related Claims Training
Workbook” (“Workbook”). The 2002 version of the Workbook mentions
forced marriage on a number of occasions as a form of gender-based
harm.68 The Workbook also reiterates that national Gender Guidelines
(specifically those of Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and
Australia),69 U.N. Gender Guidelines and the international human rights
instruments mentioned above are relevant evaluative tools in assessing
whether harms faced are contrary to international human rights norms. The
Workbook also expressly references the 1964 U.N. Convention on Consent
to Marriage, which provides that marriage should be entered with the full
and free consent of the parties.70 The 2006 version of the Workbook
included for the first time detailed discussion of forced marriage as one of
the enumerated examples of harms against women.71 The 2006 and 2009
versions of the Workbook state,
Forced marriage violates numerous human rights. It provides
an arena in which sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, domestic
violence, forced labor, and slavery often go unnoticed. Women
in forced marriages may have fewer educational and work
opportunities and their freedom of movement may be
restricted. Also, in some cultures, women and girls may be
subjected to female genital mutilation prior to the forced
marriage. Additionally, a woman’s attempt to refuse the forced
marriage may result in abusive and/or harmful treatment.

66

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, art. 16(1)(b), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
67

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICES [INS], GENDER GUIDELINES FOR
OVERSEAS REFUGEE PROCESSING 1, 5 (2001), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/
documents/legal/gender_guidelines/US_DOS_Overseas_Gender_Guidelines.pdf.
68

IMMIGRATION OFFICER ACADEMY, ASYLUM OFFICE BASIC TRAINING COURSE:
FEMALE ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS, PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK 5,
9, 24 (2002) [hereinafter GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS TRAINING WORKBOOK].
69
IMMIGRATION APPELLATE AUTHORITY (UK), GENDER ASYLUM GUIDELINES §§
1.13, 2.A.24–25(2000). These guidelines operated at a tribunal level, and drew heavily upon
a model developed in 1998 by the Refugee Women’s Legal Group. REFUGEE WOMEN'S
LEGAL GROUP, GENDER GUIDELINES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF ASYLUM CLAIMS IN THE
U.K. (1998). See also DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
(AUSTL.), GUIDELINES ON GENDER ISSUES FOR DECISION MAKERS (1996).
70

71

GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS TRAINING WORKBOOK, supra note 68, at 8, art. 1(1).

IMMIGRATION OFFICER ACADEMY, ASYLUM OFFICE BASIC TRAINING COURSE:
FEMALE ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS, PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK
(2006). The Gao v. Gonzales decision, which had not yet been overturned, is listed as
required reading. Id. at 1.
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Forced marriages have been asserted, and may under some
circumstances qualify, as a form of persecution. . . . The key
question in determining whether a forced marriage might
constitute persecution is whether the victim experienced or
would experience the marriage, or events surrounding the
marriage, as serious harm.72

We endorse this definition of forced marriage and its relationship
to the violation of women’s human and civil rights. Such an approach is
entirely in keeping with developing international understandings of forced
marriage as a gendered harm and given that it is being promulgated in the
training to every asylum office in the United States, it raises the
expectation that American asylum cases would be increasingly in comity
with it. However, we found that there was rarely, if ever, any judicial
analysis even approaching this level of understanding in the available
American cases. To the contrary, we found a widespread and continuing
reluctance to accept forced marriage as the basis for asylum in the United
States.
A. From Kasinga to Gao
The celebrated case of Kasinga represents the kernel of much that
has happened in American asylum law relating to forced marriage. Fatin
(1993) and Kasinga (1996) were two groundbreaking early US cases
raising gender issues, and it is notable that both of them remain required
reading in the current version of the Workbook. While Fatin concerned a
feminist woman from Iran who claimed that she would not comply with
religious observance and dress requirements,73 Kasinga involved a claim
made by a young woman from Togo, Fauziya Kassindja, that she had been
forced to marry at the age of seventeen and would be subjected to female
genital mutilation (“FGM”) prior to the consummation of the marriage.74
Forced marriage was a critical aspect of Kassindja’s flight from
Togo; it formed both an independent claim of harm and an integral aspect
of the FGM claim from the start. As part of her BIA case, Kassindja filed a
10-page affidavit.75 In the first page of this affidavit, she states twice that
she did not want to marry but that her aunt forced her. On page two,
Kassindja notes under “Family History” that her father did not support
coercion in marriage and that all of her four older sisters chose their own
husbands. On pages four to six under “Marriage,” Kassindja relates on five
72

Id. at 14-15; IMMIGRATION OFFICER ACADEMY, ASYLUM OFFICE BASIC
TRAINING COURSE: FEMALE ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS,
PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK 15–16 (2009), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/
article/AOBTC%20Lesson%2026%20Female%20Asylum%20Applications%20and%20Ge
nder-Related %20Claims.pdf.
73
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993). In that case the court accepted that
women could form a particular social group but held that the applicant had not proven a
likelihood of persecution on this basis. Id. at 1240.
74
In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996). Kassindja’s name was misspelt
by the original immigration officer; thus her case name and actual name do not match.
75
Brief for the Respondent at Exhibit A (Affidavit of Fauziya Kasinga), In re
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA Dec. 4, 1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/efoia/kasinga.htm.
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more occasions that she did not want to marry the man her aunt had
dictated and repeatedly told this to her aunt. She notes that her aunt
accepted a bride price and arranged a day for the wedding that was kept
secret from Kassindja. On the day of the wedding, Kassindja refused to
sign the marriage papers. Marriage and FGM are linked throughout her
narrative; FGM will happen because it is expected by both the aunt and the
husband as a requirement of marriage, but also because as a married
woman Kassindja will not be able to disobey or leave her husband and is
far less likely to be able to avail herself of state protection.76 In the
“Conclusion” section she states:
Now that I am married, my husband has the right to demand
that I return to him and that I be circumcised according to
tradition. The rest of the community will not protect me since a
husband has a right to say what will happen to his wife. No one
will do anything now that I am married . . . As a married
woman in Togo, the only legal place for me is with my
husband. If I were to try and go somewhere else, the police
would come and find me. . . . I would be forced to go to a
husband I did not want and risk my life being circumcised in
order to be in a marriage that my Aunt made me enter into
against my wishes.77

Forced marriage in this narrative is an integral aspect of the FGM
claim because it necessitated, as well as guaranteed, imminent FGM. It also
contributed to a failure of state protection and meant that internal
relocation was not possible. In addition, forced marriage was clearly
articulated by Kassindja as a distinct and separate harm to FGM: while the
forced marriage would result in FGM, it was not the sole harm, nor was it
the endpoint of the harm.
Yet Kassindja’s claim of forced marriage was not addressed at all
in the immigration judge’s decision (although he did refer to her in the
passive object form when he stated that she was “committed to marry
before being circumcised.”78). In the BIA decision, the majority notes in
the opening section, “The Applicant’s Testimony” that “her aunt forced her
into a polygamous marriage in October 1994, when she was 17.”79 In a
section headed “Background Information: The Asylum Application,” the
decision also notes that a translated copy of the applicant’s marriage
certificate, signed by her husband but not by Kassindja herself, was
attached to the asylum application.80 Yet, the issue of forced marriage
appears only under a heading of “Ancillary Matters” as an “alternate
claim” that was unnecessary for the BIA to address.
Thus, in Kasinga, forced marriage disappeared almost entirely
from the judicial record as well as from the extensive public discussion and
academic commentary on the case, all of which centred exclusively upon

76

Id. at 5.

77

Id. at 10.

78

In re Kasinga at *11, A 73 476 694 (Aug. 15, 1995).

79

In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 358.

80

Id. at 360.
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FGM.81 This disappearance presaged much of what was to come in
American asylum law as a multitude of gender-based issues, including
forced marriage, have been marginalized in place of a major—and we
suggest, excessive—focus on FGM. Notably, the BIA does not even index
the terms “gender,” “women,” “domestic violence” or “forced marriage” in
its Headnote Charts, although FGM is included.82 Likewise, on the INS
website under “Asylum Resources,” there is no document addressing
gender-based claims under the “Alert Series” and “Question and Answer
Series,” although there has been a specific document on FGM since 1994.83
Connie Oxford, in her sociological study of gender-based asylum
claims in the United States found the erasure of the complex and multiple
dimensions of women’s experiences of persecution extended beyond the
realm of the formal legal judgments we discuss here. Oxford undertook
fieldwork in the early 2000s, comprising observations and interviews with
a range of service providers and agents in the asylum process, such as
doctors, psychologists and lawyers. She found that a broad range of agents
in the asylum process actively encouraged applicants to pursue FGM
grounds of claim and subordinated, ignored or failed to inquire about other
forms of gendered harm such as forced marriage and domestic violence.84
The other significant aspect of the Kasinga decision is that it
reveals an attempt by the INS to frame issues concerning gender in sharp
contradistinction to the then-recently released INS Gender Guidelines. The
INS attempted to put forward a broad “framework of analysis” for FGM
claims in which it conceded that the risk of involuntary FGM in the future
could be a form of persecution, but attempted to exclude those who had
experienced FGM in the past from eligibility for asylum. While the
majority of the BIA ignored these arguments, focusing instead on the
81
See, e.g., Linda Malone, Beyond Bosnia and In re Kasinga: A Feminist
Perspective on Recent Developments in Protecting Women from Sexual Violence, 14 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 319, 329–37 (1996); Connie Ericson, In re Kasinga: An Expansion of the
Grounds for Asylum for Women, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 671 (1998); Mary Sheridan, In re
Fauziya Kasinga: The United States has Opened its Doors to Victims of Female Genital
Mutilation, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 433 (1997). The case received extensive coverage in the
press, commencing with a front page article in the New York Times prior to the BIA
determination. See Celia Dugger, Woman’s Plea for Asylum Puts Tribal Ritual on Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1996; Celia Dugger, U.S. Frees African Fleeing Ritual Mutilation,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996; Op.-Ed., Refugees From Mutilation, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1996;
Celia Dugger, April 21–27; Seeking Asylum From Genital Mutilation, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 28,
1996; Celia Dugger, Board Hears Asylum Appeal in Genital-Mutilation Case, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 1996; Celia Dugger, U.S. Grants Asylum to Woman Fleeing Genital Mutilation Rite,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1996; Celia Dugger, The Asylum System Needs Work, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1996. The INS took the extraordinary step of writing a letter to the editor in
response. See David Martin, Letter to the Editor, U.S. Backs Asylum for Mutilation Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1996.
82

See Index to Precedent Volumes 16–24. Likewise in the BIA Headnote Chart,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/headnote_chart.htm (updated as at May
2009) there is no listing for “gender” or any gender related term under the any of the
Asylum categories, although FGM has its own topic under Persecution.
83

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Asylum Resources,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vg
nextoid=d2d1e89390b5d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=d2d1e8939
0b5d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD (last visited April 2, 2010); INS, ALERT SERIES:
WOMEN:
FEMALE
GENITAL
MUTILATION
(1994),
available
at
www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/alnga94-001(fgm).pdf.
84

Connie Oxford, Protectors and Victims in the Gender Regime of Asylum,
NWSA J., Fall 2005, at 18, 29–30.
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elements of the case at hand, the INS “framework” argument was briefly
touched upon by the concurring opinions. Four aspects of the INS claims
which emerge from these fleeting references merit discussion.
First, the INS arguments were informed by a combination of
“floodgates fear” and cultural relativism that we see repeated again and
again in later gender-based claims. Speaking of FGM in particular, the BIA
notes that, “The [INS] points out that it is ‘estimated that over eighty
million females have been subjected to FGM.’ It further notes that there is
‘no indication’ that ‘Congress considered application of [the asylum laws]
to broad cultural practices of the type involved here.’”85
The INS Gender Guidelines note on a number of occasions in
discussing both the issue of persecution and relevant Convention grounds,
that women may face harm on account of breaching gender-related social
mores in their country of origin. They quote also with approval the thencurrent UNHCR conclusions that women “who face harsh or inhumane
treatment due to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in
which they live may be considered a particular social group.”86 It is clear,
therefore, that the INS’s own Gender Guidelines considered that ‘broad
cultural practices’ directed towards the oppression of women were highly
relevant to, indeed paradigmatic examples of, gendered harm analysis.87
Second, as part of an overt policy argument that the BIA should
use the case as precedent to restrict rather than enlarge eligibility, the INS
contended that human rights norms were not relevant to the analysis of
persecution of women:
The Service further argues that “the Board’s interpretation
in this case must assure protection for those most at risk of
the harms covered by the statute, but it cannot simply grant
asylum to all who might be subjected to a practice deemed
objectionable or a violation of a person’s human rights.”88

This approach directly contradicts the INS Gender Guidelines
instruction that “[t]he evaluation of gender-based claims must be viewed
within the framework provided by existing international human rights
instruments and the interpretation of those instruments by international
organizations.”89
Third, in the words of the BIA, the INS argued that the test for
persecution should ‘exclude past victims of FGM from asylum eligibility if
“they consented” to it or “at least acquiesced”, as in the case of a woman
who experienced FGM as “a small child.”’90 (Binary distinctions between
past and future FGM have continued to plague American cases until very
85
In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 370 (Filppu, J., concurring) (citations omitted,
emphasis added).
86

See INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 59, at 3, 4, 14.

87
See also GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS TRAINING WORKBOOK, supra note 68, at 21
(“The fact that a practice is widespread, (eg: domestic violence, FGM, rape as part of an
occupation during war) is not relevant to determining whether the alleged acts constitute
persecution.”).
88

In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 371 (citations omitted, emphasis added).

89

See INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 59, at 2.

90

In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 371.
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recently settled by an order of the Attorney General.)91 For the purposes of
our discussion it is extremely troubling that the INS should characterize
small girls who lack the ability to meaningfully consent or power to resist
as “acquiescing” to a practice that the INS itself concedes is a human rights
abuse. In the context of forced marriage claims this would mean that
children previously subject to marriage before the legal age of consent
could likewise be characterized as “acquiescing” to it (rather than as a
priori forced to marry because they lacked the ability to consent).
Finally, American law conclusively bars those who themselves
have been persecutors from claiming asylum. The INS argued in Kasinga
that it would be, “[A]nomalous if persons facing death in their homelands
because of religious or political persecution were denied protection . . .
simply by virtue of being parents of FGM victims and having followed
tribal custom.”92
In making this argument the INS implicitly posited a hierarchy of
refugee protection in which the real grounds of claim (religious or
political) and real forms of persecution (death) were being mistakenly
transplanted by considering a “custom” or “broad cultural practice”
enforced by non-state actors to be persecution. In this discursive twist we
must worry about the consequences of legal developments in genderrelated asylum law for family members who are persecutors, as it is they
who are actually the rightful victims.
At the time Kasinga was decided, the INS Gender Guidelines had
been publicly available for one year, were required reading for all
interviewing and supervising asylum officers and had been included in
training materials. In one of the two concurring opinions in Kasinga, Judge
Rosenberg noted with considerable understatement the “curious” fact that
the INS made no reference to its own published gender guidance in its
arguments. It is even more disturbing that, eleven years after Kasinga was
decided and twelve years after the promulgation of the Gender Guidelines,
American government lawyers were still making many of the arguments
outlined above in their Supreme Court petition for certiorari to overturn the
strongest judicial statement on asylum and forced marriage to date: the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Gao.
In Gao, a young woman from China, Hong Yin Gao, had been
promised in marriage in exchange for a bride price. The immigration judge
in 2003 characterized this as a “family dispute” (because Gao’s mother
“violated the oral contract” with the groom) and held that there was no
particular social group.93 This finding was summarily affirmed by the BIA
in 2004.94 In 2006 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
relevant social group was “women who have been sold into marriage
(whether or not that marriage has yet taken place) and who live in a part of
China where forced marriages are considered valid and enforceable.”95
91

Matter of A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Attorney Gen., 2008), The case overruled
In re A-T, in which the applicant had undergone FGM in the past but feared future
marriage—the BIA ignored the marriage and had found that persecution was past only as
FGM could not be repeated. 24 I. & N. Dec. 296 (BIA 2007).
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In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 373, n.2.
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Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *25, Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007)
(No. 06-1264), 2007 WL 835007. (2d Cir. March 16, 2007).
94

Id.
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Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d at 70.

Page | 19

The court also held that “lifelong involuntary marriage” was a form of
persecution.96 In 2007 the Attorney General’s petition to the Supreme
Court commenced by characterising the Second Circuit decision as,
“[E]stablishing a novel and potentially sweeping interpretation of the INA
that could have far-reaching implications for the Executive Branch’s
enforcement of immigration law in the highly sensitive context of
culturally diverse approaches to marriage. 97
The Attorney General’s petition went on to reiterate various
permutations of floodgates and cultural relativism arguments, for example
that “60% of all marriages worldwide and 96% of marriages in India, are
arranged on terms that are often similar” to those in Gao,98 and that they
reflect “broad cultural and religious acceptance” in the countries of
origin.99 Like the eighty million women potentially subject to FGM, the
sixty percent of women in arranged marriages evoke a veritable tidal wave
of claimants, which must be held at bay by stringent immigration
control.100 Yet on-shore claims by women have always represented a
minority of asylum claims in the United States101 (as elsewhere) and many
of these claims will not, of course, involve gender-related persecution.102
As in Kasinga, the government’s position on “consent” is
extremely problematic. In Gao, the fact that arranged marriage involving
the payment of a bride price was a common practice to which the applicant
did not object in principle (rather, she did not want to marry the chosen
96

Id.
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Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *3, Keisler, 552 U.S. 801(No. 06-1264). For
repeated references to the “sweeping” and “novel” approach of the court, see generally
Reply Brief on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler, 552 U.S. 801 (No. 01-1264).
98

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler, 552 U.S. 801 at *3, *19 (No. 06-

1264).
99

Id. at *21 (emphasis added). See also the references to “consistent with cultural
tradition” at *17, sensitive “cultural questions” of “marriage traditions and practices . . .
worldwide” at *19, “long-standing tradition in many cultures and countries” at *20, and the
“deep roots of such practices in the cultures and religions of a number of foreign nations” at
*22. This may be contrasted with the position stated on the website of the American
Embassy in Dhaka, Bangladesh, which reads: “Forced marriages are not the same as
arranged marriages. Arranged marriages are a part of many cultural traditions and involve
the free and full consent of both parties. Some people, however, find themselves compelled
to marry against their will, either in the United States or overseas. This is called a forced
marriage, and it is a human rights concern, as human rights principles seek to advance the
freedom and inherent dignity of each individual.” Embassy of the United States: Dhaka,
Bangladesh, supra note 43.
100
Connie Oxford finds in her study that domestic violence asylum claims
frequently invoked floodgates discourse from Immigration judges, despite their numerical
infrequency. Oxford, supra note 84, at 23.
101

Connie Oxford cites unpublished INS figures on affirmative claims by sex for
the years 1998–2002 in which women make up approximately one third of claims. Connie
Oxford, Gender-based Persecution in Asylum Law and Policy in the United States 20
(2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pittsburgh), (on file with authors).
102
Id. at 46–48 (regarding the difficulty in the American context of obtaining
precise data regarding the number of gender-related persecution claims). Although this was
expressly acknowledged in a recent brief by the Department of Homeland Security in a
refugee case concerning domestic violence. See Supplemental Brief of Department of
Homeland Security, supra note 55, at 13–14 n. 10 (demonstrating that the Department still
defined the gendered group as narrowly as possible).
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groom in particular) led the Attorney General to characterize the case as a
broken engagement, involving merely a “private dispute” between two
families103 and, breathtakingly, as a contract dispute.104 In other contexts,
the United States government would characterize the payment of money to
others for possession of women as slavery, sexual slavery and/or
trafficking—all of which are both domestic and international crimes.105
Lastly, the Attorney General’s position in Gao continues to reorder persecutors as victims, restating the argument from Kasinga that a
finding of persecution based on this “cultural practice” would exclude
those who participated in it from obtaining asylum under American law,
“thereby potentially barring thousands of persons—parents, relatives, and
matchmakers . . . from obtaining asylum, regardless of the severity of
persecution they might face.”106
Because the Supreme Court reversed and remanded Gao on the
narrow basis that the Appeals Court ought not have reformulated the
protected social group itself (but rather remitted to the BIA to do so), none
of these arguments were ultimately addressed. What is troubling in both
Kasinga and Gao is their revelation of the commitment at such high levels
of the immigration executive in the United States to a long-term strategy of
undermining, even openly violating, their own gender guidance.
III. THE REFUGEE CASES
In total we identified forty-eight American cases where forced
marriage was articulated as part of a claim to asylum or withholding of
deportation covering the period 1994 to 2008 (inclusive).107 In our analysis
103

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 at 21 (2007)
(No. 06-1264).
104

Id. at *15, *17, *22.

105

See, e.g., Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 25, annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 62d plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (2001), (ratified by the United States on Nov. 3, 2005);
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery, Apr. 30, 1957, 226 U.N.T.S. 3 (ratified by the United
States on Dec. 6, 1967). The United States has also passed numerous acts to prevent
trafficking both domestically and internationally. See, e.g., Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18, 22, 27, 42 U.S.C.), the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. 1595, 22 U.S.C. 7109(a) (2003), the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558, (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 42 U.S.C.), and the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat 5044 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 6, 8, 18, 22, 28, 42 U.S.C.). They have also established the President’s
Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. U.S. Department of
State, The President's Interagency Task Force To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in
Persons, Senior Policy Operating Group, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/2009/120224.htm
(last visited Apr. 2, 2010). Within the Department of State there is the Office to Monitor
and Combat Trafficking in Persons. U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and
Combat Trafficking in Persons, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
106
Reply Brief on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *8, Keisler, 552 U.S. 801, at
*8 (2007) (No. 01-1264); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *21, Keisler v. Gao,
552 U.S. 801 (2007) (No. 06-1264).
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As with the broader study, the search terms used were “forced marriage,”
“forced to marry,” and “pressure to marry.” In the United States, the databases used were
LEXIS and Westlaw, with searches also made of the BIA Precedent Decisions and the
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we compare the American cases with findings from a previous study of all
available administrative tribunal and court refugee determinations from the
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia on forced marriage (“the
international data set”).108 Success rates of claims, while drawn from only a
partial case set and based upon small numbers of claims, provide a rough
benchmark from which to start.109 The overall positive rate in the United
States decisions was thirty-one percent, almost identical to our findings of
a thirty-two percent positive rate from the international data set.110
In addition to unique features of the American system noted
earlier, there are several other factors, which warrant caution in drawing
direct comparisons between the United States and other countries. Like the
international data set, the claims made in the United States are diverse and
arise from a wide range of different countries of origin (fourteen in total).
Only four countries—Mali, Nigeria, India and China—gave rise to more
than one claim in the United States.111 However, unlike the international
data set, the United States evinced a massive concentration of cases arising
from just one country. Thirty of the American cases (or 63%) arose from
China, a country of origin, which did not feature heavily in the decisions of
any of the other receiving countries in the international data set.112 This
reflects the high numbers of on-shore claims from China in the United
States generally as well as the high proportion of claims in which forced
sterilization and abortion were raised by virtue of their specific statutory
inclusion in the United States refugee definition. We found that claims of
Hastings Center for Gender and Refugee Studies collections. A small number of 2009 cases
are referred to in discussion but not included in statistical analysis as we were not able to
gather cases for the entire year and the international data ended at December 2008. In the
international data set, Australian cases were all obtained from the Austlii case database
(www.austlii.edu.au). United Kingdom cases were obtained from the Electronic
Immigration Network case database (www.ein.org.uk), the Asylum and Immigration
Tribunal website (www.ait.gov.uk), LEXIS, Bailii (http://www.bailii.org) and U.N.
RefWorld databases. Canadian cases were obtained from the QuickLaw, Canlii
(www.canlii.org) and LEXIS databases.
108

The international data set comprised 120 decisions in total, made up of sixtynine decisions from Australia, forty from Canada and a mere eleven from the United
Kingdom.
109
We count “positive” or “negative” decisions from the perspective of the
applicant, even if (as in the case of judicial review) the decision is one of remittal and
reconsideration of the claim rather than an ultimate positive determination of refugee status.
In general this gives an inflated sense of “positive” outcomes, as we do not have access to
the majority of the remittal determinations and some, perhaps many, of these will ultimately
be negative to the applicant. When the cases are disproportionately made up of judicial
review decisions, as in the United States, the positive figure is likely to be even less
representative of substantive results.
110
These figures mask significant divergence across the receiving nations, with
the positive rate forty-three percent in Canada and twenty-six percent in Australia. In the
United Kingdom, of only eleven decisions, three were positive but two of these were in fact
remittals.
111
The other countries of origin are Kosovo, Cameroon, Guinea, Iran, Ivory
Coast, Kenya, Pakistan, Philippines, Togo and Zambia. Some countries had more than one
available decision but these arose from the same claimant at different levels of the appellate
system.
112
In fact, there were only four claims from China in the international data set,
one of which was successful. The top five countries of origin in the international data set
were Bangladesh, Nigeria, India, Iran and Ghana.
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forced marriage appeared alongside those of coercive reproductive policies
more broadly in a number of cases from China, and that these claims were
more likely to demonstrate changed grounds through the process and to be
dismissed on the basis of negative credibility as a result. It also appears that
the high profile case of Gao (until overturned a year later, led to a spike of
similar claims.113
It should also be noted that the American case set was very heavily
dominated by Court of Appeals decisions,114 with only two BIA decisions
and six immigration judge decisions available. This gives an artificially
high sense of success rates for forced marriage claims in the United States
because positive court decisions do not result in a grant of asylum but
rather to a remittal of the case back to the BIA, which may then again
refuse asylum.115 Moreover, some of the positive court decisions were
made on a basis other than the forced marriage claim.116 In addition, the
high proportion of appellate decisions meant that the BIA’s approach to
these issues was often not made clear.117 Elsewhere we have focused on
lower-level administrative tribunals for the very reason that this is where
the vast bulk of decision-making occurs in refugee law.
Another significant difference with the American cases was that
there were none in which a forced marriage claim was brought by a lesbian
or gay man. Rather, all forty-eight claims concerned people who were, or
were presumed to be, heterosexual: forty-five claims were brought by
women, one claim was brought jointly by a woman with her male partner
and two were brought solely by men (both of which failed). This stands in
striking contrast to the international data set, where forty percent of the
claims concerned gay or lesbian applicants.118 In the international data set,
forced marriage claims by gay men and lesbians were important in raising
the intersection of gender and sexuality norms, although these connections
were not always (or even often) received and analysed in a particularly
sophisticated manner. However, in the United States, the complete absence
113

More than half of the claims from China are post-Gao and several feature
strong factual similarities.
114
Thirty-nine of the forty-eight decisions (or eighty-one percent of the decision
pool) were appellate court judgments. In the international data set the proportion of
appellate court decisions was only thirty-eight percent.
115

Of a total of fifteen positive decisions, eleven were from the Court of Appeals,
meaning that only four of the positive decisions definitely led to a grant of asylum or
withholding of removal.
116

Of the eleven positive decisions at court level, three were on another basis
(such as failure to consider the consequences on return of the applicant’s illegal departure or
changed circumstances in the country of origin).
117
It is also possible that many claims of forced marriage at early levels are
simply “lost” from the record if they were unsuccessful and not reiterated at higher levels.
118
In the international data set there were fifty-eight percent heterosexual women,
thirty-two percent gay men, eight percent lesbians, and two percent heterosexual men. This
led to significant differences in the way that claims were framed and received. Marriage
itself was usually the central feature of heterosexual women’s claims, whereas it was often a
more minor or cumulative part of a claim brought by lesbians and gay men. The lesbian
cases were roughly divided, with slightly more than half of them featuring actual forced
marriage or a specific threat such that forced marriage was central to the claim in a manner
akin to the heterosexual women’s cases, while the other half were more similar to the gay
men’s claims in that homophobically motivated persecution was the core element of a claim
in which marriage was a general threat or more tangential aspect.
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of a sexual orientation dimension in the marriage cases meant that
“gender” was generally seen by decision-makers as concerning only
women.119
A. Particular Social Group
While claims of forced marriage, like other gender-related claims,
could be brought on the basis of the religious or political opinion (or
imputed political opinion) grounds, overwhelmingly they are framed on the
particular social group ground.120 We found that the definition of particular
social group was a major stumbling block in the American cases. It was
clear from the often scant reasons in at least eighteen cases—representing
nearly forty percent of the available American case pool—that the
Immigration Judge had held at first instance that there was no relevant
Convention ground for women fleeing forced marriage.121 Alarmingly, in
a number of cases decision-makers appear to have summarily drawn this
conclusion without any written analysis or formulation of the various
possible particular social groups.122 At the level of judicial review, courts
generally did not engage with the original immigration judge or BIA
failure to define a social group if there was any other basis upon which to
uphold the original decision.123 The effect of the Supreme Court decision in
119

See also Oxford, supra note 101, at 147–51.

120
The United States, like the United Kingdom and Australia, generally rejected
gender-based claims as related to either the religious or political opinion grounds when such
claims were occasionally made. In contrast, Canadian decision-makers frequently
characterized forced marriage claims as engaging the religious or political ground under the
Convention in addition to particular social group.
121

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801, app. C at *25
(2007) (No. 06-1264); Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, vacated sub nom. Keisler v. Gao, 552
U.S. 801 (2007); Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2008) (remanded on this
basis); In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296 (BIA 2007); Berishaj v. Gonzalez, 238 F.App’x 57
(6th Cir. 2007); Xiu Yun Chen v. Gonzalez, 229 F.App’x 413 (7th Cir. 2007); Yan Dan Li
v. Gonzalez, 222 F.App’x 318 (4th Cir. 2007); Hua Lin v. Gonzalez, 205 F.App’x 879 (2d
Cir. 2006); Yi Meng Tang v. Gonzalez, 200 F. App’x 68 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanded on this
basis); Chun Hua Weng v. Gonzalez, 185 F.App’x 77 (2d Cir. 2006); Himanje v. Gonzalez,
184 F.App’x 105 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanded on this basis); Lan Zhu Pan v. Gonzalez, 445
F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2006); Keita v. Gonzalez, 175 F. App’x 711 (6th Cir. 2006); Xue Qin Li v.
B.I.A., 172 F.App’x 385 (2d Cir. 2006); Li Qun Chen v. Gonzalez, 153 F.App’x 49 (2d Cir.
2005); Matter of S L (N.Y.C., NY Immigration Court, Oct. 7, 1999, copy on file with
authors); Jin Chao Zheng v. Gonzales, 236 F.App’x 726 (2d Cir. 2007); Xiao Feng Lin v.
Attorney General, 249 F.App’x 281 (3d Cir. 2007); Xiu Xia Huang v. Attorney Gen., 286
F.App’x 604 (11th Cir. 2008). In Lan Chen v. Gonzalez, it was unclear whether forced
marriage was articulated at first instance as part of political opinion claim or whether that
was entirely separate. 187 F.App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2006). In Xiao Feng Lin v. Attorney Gen.,
the BIA found social group to be a problem, overruling an immigration judge finding that
the claim was frivolous. 249 F.App’x 281 (3d Cir. 2007).
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See, e.g., Lizhu Chen v. BIA, 238 Fed.App’x 669 (2d Cir. 2007); Keita v.
Gonzalez, 2006 US App. LEXIS 9484 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 2006); Li Qun Chen v. Gonzalez,
153 Fed.App’x. 49 (2d Cir. 2005).
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See, e.g., Berishaj v. Gonzalez, 238 Fed.App’x 57 (6th Cir. 2007); Xiu Yun
Chen v. Gonzalez, 229 Fed.App’x 413 (7th Cir. 2007); Yan Dan Li v. Gonzalez, 222
Fed.App’x. 318 (4th Cir. 2007); Lan Zhu Pan v. Gonzalez, 445 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2006); Xiu
Xia Huang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 286 Fed.App’x 604 (11th Cir. 2008). This was so even when,
arguably, the findings on matters such as likelihood of persecution and the question of the
nexus of persecution to the particular social group rested upon and therefore required first a
finding of what the social group actually was. See, e.g., Lan Zhu Pan v. Gonzalez, 445 F.3d
60 (1st Cir. 2006); Ying Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 319 Fed.App’x 777 (11th Cir. 2009).
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Gao is that a complete failure to define the particular social group or a
clear error in defining it will, at most, lead to the case being remitted to the
BIA, as the Court is not permitted to formulate the appropriate group. This
lack of judicial guidance on social group formulation is really regrettable,
most especially because the reasoning on particular social group in the
available American cases was dramatically worse than the other countries
examined in this study.
Canada has accepted gender-based grounds for refugee claims,
including forced marriage, from the mid-1990s and not a single Canadian
claim by a female applicant in our study was rejected on the basis of a lack
of social group. In the Canadian cases, the group was framed variously as
“women,”124 “women who refuse to follow traditional practices”125 and
“women regarded as chattels.”126 The issue of particular social group was
more contentious in Australia, although this diminished following the High
Court gender and domestic violence decision Khawar in 2000.127 Although
in the United Kingdom the House of Lords addressed gender and particular
social group in 1999 in Shah and Islam,128 early level decision makers in
the United Kingdom continued to hold at first instance that there was no
applicable social group for women fleeing forced marriage through the
early to mid-2000s. Moreover, the Home Office pursued this argument
through the appellate process.129 Yet, even in comparison to the United
Kingdom, on the issue of particular social groups the United States was
and remains the most stagnant, least coherent and most out of step with
international developments.
The early BIA approach of defining a particular social group as a
group which is bound together by common characteristics which are either
innate or so fundamental that they ought not be changed,130 as later refined
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward,131 is now one that is widely
accepted internationally as well as in the United States.132 However, the
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X. v. Canada, 2001 CanLII 26862 (Immigration & Refugee Bd.).

125

Re X., 2002 CanLII 52705 (Immigration & Refugee Bd.) at *3.

126

This was the tribunal’s own formulation. Re X., 2000 CanLII 21420
(Immigration & Refugee Bd.) at *3.
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Min. for Immigration v. Khawar (2002) 210 C.L.R 1 (Austl.). In our study,
heterosexual women claiming forced marriage had a positive rate of only eleven percent in
Australia prior to Khawar, compared to a thirty-eight percent positive rate subsequently.
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Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (U.K.).

129
This argument has been pursued to the extent of appealing positive decisions
by adjudicators. See RG (Eth.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, (2006) EWCA (Civ),
339 (Apr. 4, 2006) (Eng.).
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“The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship
ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military
leadership or land ownership . . . Whatever the common characteristic that defines the
group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be
required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or conscience.” In
re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).
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Attorney Gen. v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.).

For an overview of international approaches, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning of
“Membership of a Particular Social Group”, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL

Page | 25

BIA and various federal courts of appeal have added their own “glosses” or
additional elements to the widely accepted “innate or fundamental
characteristics” approach. These include the additional requirements of
“cohesion” or “voluntary association” among the group by the large and
influential Ninth Circuit (an approach emphatically rejected by all of the
other countries in the international data set and by UNHCR133) and, more
commonly, requiring external “social visibility” of the group.134 American
decision makers have consistently rejected broad formulations of social
group such as “women” and “young women from rural China”135 for the
above reasons. In a 2005 immigration judge decision, the claim of
membership of the much narrower “social group of Guinean Fulani women
who oppose forced, arranged marriages” was also rejected on the basis
that:
[t]he respondent has presented no evidence indicating that
women who oppose forced marriage are a cognizable social
group within Guinean Fulani society . . . The respondent did
not enter into any voluntary associations based on her
opposition to forced marriage, nor did she demonstrate that her
abuser viewed her as a member of any such group.136

Significantly, this analysis addressed only the two additional
“glosses” and not the core test of whether such women possessed an innate
or fundamental characteristic.
Similar formulations such as “young Bambara women who oppose
arranged marriage”137 were commonly rejected on the basis that the group
was not socially visible.138 Both the continued adhesion to a separate
requirement of social visibility or perception139 and the interpretation of
LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (Erika Feller,
Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003).
133

U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No.
2: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” within the context of Article 1A(2) of the
1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 15, U.N.
Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR, Guidelines on Particular Social
Group]. The Ninth Circuit was the only circuit to require a “voluntary associational
relationship.” Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986). In HernandezMontiel v. INS, the Ninth Circuit retreated from this position and held that a particular social
group is one united by an innate characteristic or by a voluntary association. 225 F.3d 1084
(9th Cir. 2000).
134
See Aleinikoff, supra note 132; Marouf, supra note 50. More recently the BIA
has formulated this as a question of “particularity” requiring recognition by society as “a
discrete class of persons.” Matter of S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 594 (BIA 2008).
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Lan Zhu Pan v. Alberto Gonzalez, 445 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2006).
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Matter of A-D-A (Bos., MA Immigration Court, Sept. 19, 2005) at *13 (on file
with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies).
137

In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 303 (BIA 2007), vacated on other grounds by
In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Attorney Gen. 2008).
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See Matter of S L (N.Y.C., NY Immigration Court, Oct. 7, 1999) (rejecting the
application on the basis that there was not a cohesive group with voluntary association) (on
file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies).
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Note that the Department of Homeland Security reaffirmed these requirements
in its recent brief supporting domestic violence as the basis of a refugee claim. See
Supplemental Brief of Department of Homeland Security, supra note 55. The Department’s
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this requirement are at odds with UNHCR Guidelines. In its 2003
Guidelines on Particular Social Group, UNHCR notes both the “innate or
fundamental characteristic” approaches and the “social perception”
approaches to group analysis, and formulates them as alternatives to each
other rather than as additional requirements in framing a social group.140
Moreover, UNHCR has repeatedly stated that the broad social group of
“women in X country” should satisfy both bases.141
In common with international standards, the United States requires
that a particular social group cannot be solely defined by reference to the
persecution. This offers additional challenges when the group is narrowly
defined. So, for example, a group formulated as “women in Iran who are
forced by their fathers to marry” is unacceptable because the defining
characteristic of the group is the persecution they face. Yet, persecution
may still be considered as a relevant factor in the group definition if it is
not the exclusive factor in defining the group.142 It was clear in our study
that Canada took a less strict approach to this issue than the United
Kingdom or Australia, while the issue was particularly difficult in the
United States because of the widespread rejection of broader formulations
of particular social groups on the basis that they were not socially visible or
not likely to be singled out for persecution. This meant that applicants and
their advisors in the United States struggled for narrower formulations,

proposed formulations of the particular social group in that brief (“Mexican women in
domestic relationships who are unable to leave” or “Mexican women who are viewed as
property by virtue of their position within a domestic relationship”) are as circular as the
proposed particular social group rejected by the Department (“Mexican women in an
abusive relationship who are unable to leave”) in terms of the role of persecution in defining
the group, discussed below, and moreover requires a similar degree of contortion to
characterize them as socially visible, distinct and cognizable groups. Id. at 10–15
(discussing the Department’s view of the different proposed particular social groups).
Surely the reason that women are viewed as property within domestic relationships or are
unable to leave relationships is because women generally are disempowered in both social
and legal terms in the society in question: thus the appropriate particular social group should
simply be “women in Mexico.”
140

UNHCR, Guidelines on Particular Social Group, supra note 133, at ¶¶ 10–12;
UNHCR, Gender Guidelines, supra note 64, at ¶ 29. It is ironic that the social perception
approach reached its zenith in Applicant A v. Australia, rejecting Chinese facing forced
sterilization as a particular social group, while the United States entrenched the social
visibility approach at the same time that it prioritised this particular experience of
persecution above others through defining it as a basis for asylum in statute. (1997) 190
C.L.R. 225; see also supra note 53.
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UNHCR, Guidelines on Particular Social Group, supra note 133, ¶¶ 7, 12, 18;
UNHCR, Gender Guidelines, supra note 64, ¶ 30. As noted by the Third Circuit in 1993 in
Fatin, “The phrase ‘particular social group’ was first placed in the INA when Congress
enacted the Refugee Act of 1980. Pub.L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). While the
legislative history of this act does not reveal what, if any, specific meaning the members of
Congress attached to the phrase ‘particular social group,’ the legislative history does make
clear that Congress intended ‘to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the
1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577, to which the United States acceded in 1968.’” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239
(3rd Cir. 1993). Relevant contemporary international guidance is relevant to whether in fact
such conformity is being achieved in accordance with the original legislative intent.
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UNHCR Guidelines on Particular Social Group note that if the social visibility
approach is used, as it is in the United States, “persecutory actions towards a group may be
a relevant factor in determining the visibility of a group in a particular society.” UNHCR,
Guidelines on Particular Social Group, supra note 133, ¶ 14.
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which were then in danger of being rejected on the basis that the group was
solely defined by the persecution.143
The case of Elizabeth Ngengwe illustrates this dangerous
balancing act between narrow and broad formulations of the social group.
Ngengwe claimed that she was subject to persecution as a widow by her
husband’s family following his death. The family had demanded that she
marry one of her deceased husband’s brothers (levirate marriage) or repay
a bride price that her family had received on her original marriage. In 2003,
before the immigration judge, Ngengwe offered both broader
(“Cameroonian widows” or “widowed females who are forced into
marriage because of tradition or cultural values in Cameroon”) and
narrower formulations of the group (“widowed females who are falsely
accused of killing their husbands because they are not from the same
tribe.”144) Despite the fact that there was a State Department Country
Report in evidence which indicated that as a matter of customary law,
widowed women in Cameroon were required by force to marry one of the
deceased’s brothers,145 the government contended before the Immigration
Judge that widowed women facing forced marriage was “too broad a
category to be cognizable as a particular social group” under the Act.146
The government also contended that the characteristics of this group were
not innate or immutable, as the applicant had “the power to change” by
either marrying or paying back the bride price. The immigration judge
accepted all of these arguments.147 In addition, the immigration judge
found that the broadest formation of “widows” was not sufficiently
homogenous to be cognizable as a group and rejected the narrower
formulation of “widows facing forced marriage” because it defined the
group by reference to the persecution. The immigration judge also rejected
the narrowest group on the basis that this amounted to “simply a widowed
female, who is disliked by her in-laws” and was therefore merely
personal.148 The BIA affirmed this on review. However, on appeal, the
Eighth Circuit held that it was an error to reject the broadest formulation of
143
So, for example, the proposed particular social group “young women
threatened with imprisonment for failing to oblige the demands of a government official to
marry his relation” was rejected on this basis. Xiao Feng Lin v. Attorney General, 249
F.App’x 281 (3rd Cir. 2007).
144
See Matter of E S N (Kan. City, MO Immigration Court, Jan. 14, 2003) at *8
(on file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies). On appeal the Eighth
Circuit expressed these somewhat differently, as “Cameroonian widows” and “widowed
Cameroonian female member[s] of the Bamileke tribe, in the Southern region that [belong]
to a family or [have] in-laws from a different tribe and region, the Bikom tribe in the
Northwest province, who have falsely accused [them] of causing [their husbands’] death.”
Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2008).
145

Matter of E S N (Kan. City, MO Immigration Court, Jan. 14, 2003) at *15–*16
(on file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies).
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Id. at 9. Again note this is not in conformity with the UNHCR approach, which
holds that the size of the group is irrelevant. UNHCR Guidelines on Particular Social
Group, supra note 133, at ¶ 18; UNHCR, Gender Guidelines, supra note 64, ¶ 31.
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The immigration judge did so without examining the second aspect of the
immutability requirement, which is whether the characteristics were so fundamental to
human dignity that she ought not to be required to change them. See generally Matter of E S
N (Kan. City, MO Immigration Court, Jan. 14, 2003) (on file with The Hastings Center for
Gender & Refugee Studies).
148
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Id. at 13.

“Cameroonian widows” because the United States government’s own
country of origin evidence plainly demonstrated that they did share
common immutable characteristics (gender and the experience of losing a
husband) and were in fact viewed as a socially distinct group.
The British experience is instructive here. In 2005, after an
exhaustive review of the case law on particular social group and gender,
the United Kingdom Immigration Appeal Tribunal noted “from experience
that such cases often appear to become bogged down in pedantic and often
unnecessary argument as to definition of the particular social group.”149 In
that case, the tribunal took the step of itself formulating the group (as
“Young Iranian Women who refuse to enter into arranged marriages”),
holding that this group was defined by its non-conformity rather than the
persecutory outcome, which followed, and thus presented an acceptable
basis for the particular social group.150 Thus, resistance or opposition to the
oppression (which is surely implicit in the making of the refugee claim)
rather than the actual experience of the persecution was centered as the
basis of group membership. Ironically, this represents a belated acceptance
of the position first put by UNHCR in 1985,151 restated over and over since
then in various gender guidelines and articulated in the earliest of the
American gender cases: that the basis of many women’s claim to a
particular social group will be their non-conformity with prevailing social
mores.
In sum, the American approach to gender-based particular social
groups proved to be a major barrier to forced marriage claims. This was
especially due to the rejection of broadly based groups (such as ‘women’)
because of to the American interpretation of additional requirements that
the group be “visible,” “particular” and “distinct.” However, narrower
groups were also in danger of being rejected if the formulation of the group
was, or was seen to be, too reliant upon the persecution that its members
experienced or if it was so specific that it was viewed by decision-makers
as unlikely to be singled out by persecutors or as a “personal” experience
rather than a group identity.
In addition to the fact that American asylum law has consistently
rejected both broadly and narrowly-framed gendered groups, it is very
troubling that in the United States the onus is so strongly upon the
applicants themselves to frame the group, with little or no input or
guidance from the relevant decision maker. In the American cases
numerous applicants failed because they did not themselves frame an
appropriate group, or do not frame it early enough in the process,152 even in
cases where their testimony as to the experience of forced marriage was
149

TB, [2005] UKAIT 00065 ¶ 66(9 Mar. 2005).

150
Id. ¶ 57. Cf. Berishaj v. Gonzalez, 238 F.App’x 57, 62 n.3 (6th Cir. 2007)
(noting that the Immigration Judge rejected petitioner’s claim that she fell under a
recognizable particular social group constituting of “a woman who is not willing to go
through a forced marriage” and doubting but not disturbing this ruling); Xiu Yun Chen v.
Gonzalez, 229 F.App’x 413, 415 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that the Immigration Judge rejected
petitioner’s claim that she fell under a recognizable particular social group constituting of
“young females who are against marrying” and doubting but not disturbing this ruling).
151

See UNHCR, Refugee Women and International Protection supra note 1, at §
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See, e.g., Xue Qin Li v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 172 F.App’x 385 (2d Cir.

k.

2006).
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accepted as truthful and persecution was established.153 This failure is out
of step with the formulation by decision-makers of gender-based social
groups concerning marriage in comparable countries. These failures of
analysis and engagement in the particular social group definition have
severely retarded American asylum jurisprudence on gender more broadly
and forced marriage in particular.
In order to qualify as a refugee, persecution must be “for reasons
of” one of the Convention grounds. Failure to properly define the particular
social group also had flow-on effects in the analysis of the nexus between
the Convention ground and the persecution, creating an additional doctrinal
hurdle for claimants.
B. Nexus: Marriage as Entirely Personal, Occasionally Commercial
and Different in Foreign Places
Marriage was often understood by decision makers as a “cultural”
or “traditional” experience such that there frequently was not seen to be
any nexus between claims of forced marriage and a Convention ground.
Pressure to marry was sometimes characterized as lacking a nexus
because it was an experience that affected men also.154 More commonly,
claims were seen as lacking nexus—even when the conduct associated with
the marriage was accepted as persecutory—because the harm or “dispute”
was viewed by the decision-maker as “entirely personal.”155 For example in
the 2005 decision of AD, the immigration judge held that, “[T]he abuse the
respondent suffered resulted solely from her uncle’s desire to punish her
for disobeying his request [to marry].” The abuse constituted a personal
retaliation, not an act of persecution directed at a member of a particular
social group.156
In addition, in some cases the fact that the applicant was opposed
to marrying a particular individual rather than opposed to arranged
marriage in general was interpreted by the decision-maker as meaning that
there was no nexus because the actions of the victim were based on
personal preference.157
In three different cases involving the payment of bride prices for
young Chinese women adjudicated at different levels over a ten-year
period, courts held that there was no nexus with a Convention ground
because the marriage “dispute” was characterised as both “purely personal”
and inherently commercial. In the 1999 case of SL the immigration judge
stated:
153

See, e.g., Hua Lin v. Gonzalez, 205 F.App’x 879 (2d Cir. 2006); Berishaj v.
Gonzalez, 238 F.App’x 57 (6th Cir. 2007); Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 319 F. App’x 777 (11th
Cir. 2009).
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See, e.g., In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 303 (BIA 2007) (“family pressures to
accede to arranged marriages are not necessarily confined to females”), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Attorney Gen. 2008).
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See, e.g., Matter of S L (N.Y.C., NY Immigration Court, Oct. 7, 1999) at *14,
aff’d sub nom. (on file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies); Shu Lin v.
Gonzalez, 148 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2005).
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Matter of A-D-A (Bos., MA Immigration Court, Sept. 19, 2005) at *13 (on file
with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies).
157

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 app.. C at *20
(2007) (No. 06-1264); Syed v. Mukasey, 288 F. App’x 273 (7th Cir. 2008).
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In this case, we have one party, the mayor, who wants to
enforce the terms of a valid contract; while the other side, the
respondent and her family, wants to void the terms of the
contract. This case would be better litigated in civil court rather
than Immigration Court. If respondent’s family was persecuted
after she left, it was because they breached the terms of the
contract and not because of the mayor’s intention to punish
them for one of the five enumerated [Convention] grounds in
the Act.158

This decision was summarily affirmed by the BIA and again on
judicial review by the Second Circuit in 2005.159
In 2003, in the oral decision delivered in Gao the immigration
judge repeatedly characterised the issue as a “dispute between two
families” over a “marriage arrangement” and as “some kind of a
contract,”160 concluding that, “[H]er mother violated the oral contract that
she had with this go-between, and that is what caused the anger by the
boyfriend in this situation and not political opinion or a particular social
group membership.”161
This decision was summarily affirmed by the BIA. On appeal in
2006, the Second Circuit responded:
To the extent that the Immigration Judge might have reasoned
that the financial arrangement between the families somehow
precluded a finding that Zhi’s motive in targeting Gao was
discriminatory, we reject this logic as antithetical to the very
notion of individual rights on which asylum law is based.
While Zhi may have a legitimate financial claim against Gao’s
parents, the possibility remains that if they continue to be
unable to repay his money, Zhi will force Gao to marry him.162

Because the Second Circuit decision was vacated by the Supreme
Court in 2007 on other grounds, this statement is left as obiter dicta only.
Instead the more recent judicial authority from the Eleventh Circuit
approves the “valid contract” approach to vitiating nexus. In this third and
most recent case, Ying Lin, an Immigration Judge in 2006 accepted an
applicant’s claims that her parents promised her in marriage to a man who
claimed her as payment for a gambling debt owed to him, yet went on to
dismiss the harm experienced as “entirely a personal matter” between her
family and the intended groom.163 The BIA adopted and affirmed the
Immigration Judge’s decision in 2008. In 2009 the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the decision and held that:
158

Matter of S L (N.Y.C., NY Immigration Court, Oct. 7, 1999) at *13–*14
(emphasis added) (on file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies). The
Immigration Judge also refers to “fearing retribution over purely personal matters.” Id.
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Shu Lin v. Gonzalez, 148 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2005).
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Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Keisler, 552 U.S. 801, app. C at *24a (No. 06-
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Id. at *25a (emphasis added).

162

Gao v. Gonzalez, 440 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original).
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Ying Lin v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 319 F.App’x 777, 779 (11th Cir. 2009).
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[A]nexus did not exist between the attempted involuntary
marriage and rape and a protected ground, in that the testimony
Lin gave did not show that she had been targeted on account of
her membership in a particular social group. The involuntary
marriage was for no reason other than repayment of her
mother’s gambling debt.164

It is significant here that the court did not see any nexus between a
young woman being in a socially vulnerable position and her being treated
by all parties as a form of payment. Unfortunately it appears that, despite
the Second Circuit’s efforts, this profound failure of analysis continues in
American case law. It is striking that domestic discourse in the United
States on human trafficking does not appear to have any impact upon the
understanding of this issue in the asylum context.
It is notable that, although in the international data set decision
makers did at times regard marriage as “universal” or see abuse at the
hands of family members as “personal”, and thus failed to find a nexus
with the particular social group in women’s claims, such findings were far
more common in the American cases. Furthermore, in the international
data set decision makers never suggested in cases concerning a bride price
or levirate marriage cases that what was at stake represented a valid
contract, nor did they ever suggest that women could or should avoid
persecution by repayment of such price, as discussed below.
In addition, American asylum law appears to be stunted by an
undue focus on the central motives of the persecutor in “singling out” the
applicant when analyzing the question of nexus between persecution and
the Convention ground.165 This is out of step with international and
UNHCR approaches to nexus, which stress that nexus can be satisfied
either by the motives for the singling out by the persecutor or by the basis
upon which there was a failure of state protection.166 That is, a “purely
personal” attack by a non-state actor upon a woman who refuses to marry
should still satisfy the nexus requirement if the basis of the failure of state
protection was the government’s disinterest in protecting women from
domestic or familial violence. In the international data set this dual nexus
was well accepted.
C. Persecution
In 2006 the Second Circuit made arguably the strongest judicial
pronouncement on forced marriage when it stated that “[Gao] might well
be persecuted in China—in the form of lifelong involuntary marriage.”167
Because this decision was vacated (although on another basis), American
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Id. at 781–82 (emphasis added).
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See, e.g., Syed v. Mukasey, 288 F.App’x 273 (7th Cir. 2008).
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See UNHCR, Guidelines on Particular Social Group, supra note 133, ¶ 23;
UNHCR, Gender Guidelines, supra note 64, ¶21. See also Min. for Immigration v.
Khawar, (2002) 210 C.L.R 1 (Austl.); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [1999] 2
A.C. 629 (U.K.).
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courts since have continued to regard the question of whether forced
marriage constitutes persecution as “an open issue.”168
Although an unwanted marriage was often articulated by claimants
as either an integral aspect of another feared harm such as FGM or as an
independent basis of the claim, in American case law it was infrequently
received as either one. Applicants’ assertions of forced marriage were not
infrequently reframed in decisions as “arranged” marriage,169 and
expressed as “unwanted,”170 with persecutors restyled as “suitors”171 and
their threats as “proposals.”172 As with the particular social group issue,
one of the most alarming trends in the American cases was the complete
failure to offer any analysis at all for the conclusion that forced marriage
was not persecutory.173
In cases involving a bride price or widow’s dowry, it was striking
how often the decision maker placed the onus upon the applicant to repay
the sum (including extremely large sums, funds that were paid to others
and sums paid many years earlier) in order to avoid persecutory
consequences.174 For example, in the 2003 case of Ngengwe discussed
earlier, where the applicant faced forced levirate marriage or repayment of
her original dowry, the immigration judge suggested that since she had
been in the United States for twenty months she, “Could send money to her
in-law’s family if she chose to do so to pay back any money that they view
is owed... but she has made no attempt to alleviate the threat of future harm
by paying back to them the ‘bride’s price’.”175
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Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1036 (8th Cir. 2008).
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See, e.g., In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 297, 302 (BIA 2007), remanded on
other grounds sub nom. In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Attorney Gen. 2008); Matter of
Anon (Buffalo, NY Immigration Court, Dec. 14, 1999) (on file with The Hastings Center
for Gender & Refugee Studies). See also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at *12, Keisler v.
Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007) (No. 06-1264) (referring to the particular social group as “women
in arranged marriages.”).
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Yan Hua Lin v. Gonzales, 246 F.App’x 746, 748–49 (2d Cir. 2007).
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Id.; Matter of Anon (Chi., IL Immigration Court, Oct. 18, 2000) at *2, *7 (but
note that this was a positive decision) (on file with The Hastings Center for Gender &
Refugee Studies).
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Xiu Yun Chen v. Gonzalez, 229 F.App’x 413 (7th Cir. 2007); Matter of A-DA (Bos., MA Immigration Court, Sept. 19, 2005) at *4 (on file with The Hastings Center for
Gender & Refugee Studies). In a related tone, see the use of forced marriage in disclaiming
inverted commas in Keita v. Gonzalez, 2006 U,S, App. LEXIS 9484, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr.
13, 2006); Matter of E S N (Kan. City, MO Immigration Court, Jan. 14, 2003) at *10 (on
file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies).
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In only one appellate level decision we identified did the Court of Appeals find
legal error and remand a case to the BIA for failing to consider the claim of forced marriage
in its reasons. Notably, in that case the issue was whether the threat of forced marriage
constituted a changed circumstance (justifying an out of time claim) rather than whether it
constituted persecution per se. Joseph v. Gonzales, 240 F.App’x 726 (7th Cir. 2007).
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See the three Chinese contract cases discussed above. See also Jin Chao Zheng
v. Gonzales, 236 F.App’x 726, 727 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding no nexus when an official
offered to waive a fine levied at the applicant’s parents if she would marry his son because
she “did not claim that her parents were unwilling to pay the fine, just that they could not
afford to do so”).
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Matter of E S N (Kan. City, MO Immigration Court, Jan. 14, 2003) at *17 (on
file with The Hastings Center for Gender & Refugee Studies); see also id. at 18 (“she
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Although summarily affirmed by the BIA, in 2008 the Eighth
Circuit remitted this issue for reconsideration on the basis that the “IJ
offered no analysis, and cited no law, on why the choice between forced
marriage, death, or paying an unaffordable bride’s price does not constitute
persecution.”176
The case of A-T in 2007 is a particularly disturbing example of the
failure to understand forced marriage as a form of persecution. In that case
the BIA stated:
It appears from the record that the respondent and her intended
fiancé are of similar ages and backgrounds, given the
respondent’s testimony that she and her cousin played together
as children, and that the family used to joke that they would
one day marry. Thus, if the respondent were to return to Mali
and proceed with the marriage, it is not likely that she would
be in a disadvantaged position in relation to her husband on
account of her age or economic status.
It is understandable that the respondent, an educated young
woman, would prefer to choose her own spouse rather than
acquiesce to pressure from her family to marry someone she
does not love and with whom she expects to be unhappy. The
respondent has also expressed valid concerns about possible
birth defects resulting from a union with her first cousin. While
we do not discount the respondent’s concerns, we do not see
how the reluctant acceptance of family tradition over personal
preference can form the basis for a withholding of removal
claim.177

This first paragraph suggests that a forced marriage will only be
harmful if there is a significant age or economic difference in the parties’
relative positions, rather than constituting a human rights violation in and
of itself. Somewhat ironically, given that such claims have been mostly
unsuccessful in the United States, it also implicitly suggests the payment of
a bride price for a young woman by an older man is the paradigmatic
example of forced marriage. It is also noteworthy that in the second
paragraph, being forced to marry is transformed into “acquiescence” and
“reluctant submission,” suggesting that actual consent is not necessarily
required.
While the decision was vacated and remanded by the AttorneyGeneral in 2008, this was on the basis of a failure to consider the
relationship between past FGM and any future harm. The question of
forced marriage was addressed merely in a footnote to the decision, which
noted that the Board had appeared to make contradictory findings on
whether the forced marriage and FGM were related and left this “for the
Board to revisit or clarify on remand as needed.”178
certainly could send money to her in-law’s family to alleviate any possible threat that she
might face”).
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In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296. 302–03 (BIA 2007), vacated sub nom. Matter
of A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Attorney Gen. 2008) (remanding the case on the issue of
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itself.
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What has been completely lost in the cases discussed above is the
basic tenet that a forced marriage is persecutory because it breaches the
fundamental human right to full and free consent in marriage. Yet, freedom
to marry the partner of one’s choosing has been repeatedly acknowledged
as fundamental to human dignity in domestic constitutional litigation in the
United States. While historically such challenges were to prohibitions on
interracial marriage, more recently they have addressed same-sex
marriage.179 Regardless of whether legislative restrictions on marriage have
been struck down or upheld, decisions in such cases have emphatically
propounded the importance of marriage as both an individual right and as a
voluntary social institution that fosters wider harmony and social
stability.180 A contemporary Western ideal of marriage as romantic,
egalitarian and companionate (as opposed to, say, dutiful, self-sacrificing
or asymmetrical in power) is strongly present in such domestic case law
and is never trivialized, as it was in In re A-T, as mere “personal
preference.”
In Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, a majority judgment of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court declared that the state of marriage “nurtures
love and mutual support” and is “at once a deeply personal commitment to
another human being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of
mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity and family.”181 That judgment
also characterized marriage as crucial to the formation of self-identity and
to individual self-fulfilment, claiming inter alia that, “[w]ithout the right to
marry—or more properly, the right to choose to marry—one is excluded
from the full range of human experience”182 and “the decision whether and
whom to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”183 The
ideas of marriage expressed in such cases—as the unique fulfilment of selfhood in a state of loving unity, and as an expression of human dignity
fundamental to human rights—are conspicuous by their resounding
absence in refugee cases concerning forced marriage where decision
makers rarely, if ever, articulated coerced marriage (and concomitant
inability to also choose to enter into a voluntary marriage with someone
else) as a persecutory harm.
IV. WHO WINS? THE SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS
Despite the persistent doctrinal hurdles in applying refugee law
principles to forced marriage cases as explored above, some of the

179

See, e.g., Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Goodridge v. Dep’t of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (2005);
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decisions in our data set were positive. As noted earlier, at the broadest
level the rate of positive decisions in the United States was comparable
with the international data set.184 We gathered together the positive
American decisions to analyze the key elements of a successful claim. The
results of this analysis are disappointing. There were fifteen positive
decisions in the United States portion of our data set. We counted
“positive” decisions as those in which the outcome was what the claimant
sought at that stage. Of the fifteen positive decisions, eleven were judicial
review decisions by appellate courts. This means that a “positive” case was
often merely a remittal for redetermination of the claim rather than an
actual grant of asylum. Furthermore, as many of the positive outcomes
occurred at the appellate level on judicial review there is often little
information about the factual background to the decision.
The characteristics of successful claims varied considerably. The
fifteen claimants came from nine different countries, with China as the
only country of origin with more than one successful claimant.185 The high
number of claimants from China is likely not indicative of a greater
openness to these claims, but instead reflects the high number of asylum
applicants each year from China as well as the considerable evidence that
forced marriage is an important human rights issue in China and the
specific statutory recognition of forced abortion and sterilization can
constitute persecution in US law.186
Of the positive decisions, Gao, discussed above, was later
overturned by the Supreme Court. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in
Gao, the Second Circuit issued a small series of three positive decisions
relying on its original Gao reasoning.187 The Second Circuit has not issued
another positive decision following the Supreme Court decision, despite
the fact that the decision did not actually rule out the possibility of finding
a particular social group or persecution in the context of forced marriage.188
In four of the positive decisions, including Kasinga, forced
marriage was not mentioned in the analysis at all, only in the facts.189 In a
184

Positive results among the United States data set constituted thirty-one percent
of all cases, whereas in the international set such cases constituted thirty-two percent of all
cases, although as noted earlier this rate is misleadingly high. See supra notes 105, 110–11.
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further two decisions forced marriage appears only as an incidental factor
related to FGM.190 Excluding the positive cases where the claim of forced
marriage is not mentioned in the decision, cases which were analyzed only
as FGM claims, and the four cases belonging to the Gao gap (including
Gao itself), as well as one case in which the forced marriage argument was
found not credible but a positive decision was granted on another
ground,191 a mere four positive decisions remain. In short, counting 15 of
our 48 decisions as positive vastly over-represents the chance of ‘success’
for forced marriage refugee claimants.
The singularly most striking factor in the positive American cases
is that forced marriage was in itself never found to be a form of persecution
in any decision. While only four decisions in the international data set
contained a strong analysis of forced marriage alone as a form of
persecution of a vulnerable group, none of the successful American
decisions did so.192 This is directly at odds with international human rights
standards and with all guidelines—including the INS Gender Guidelines—
on gender-related persecution.
In the international data set, we found that positive claims were
most often related to factors additional to the forced marriage itself. This
“something more” was sometimes an understanding that forced marriage
would constitute a catalyst for other harm such as domestic or sexual
violence or FGM. In claims brought by gay men, forced marriage was
often considered one way that their sexual orientation might become
known, and therefore would lead to persecution for that reason. While
such cases did not center forced marriage in itself as persecution, they at
least recognized the linkages between forced marriage and other forms of
gendered harms and harms related to sexuality.193
Like many of the positive decisions in the international data set,
the US positive decisions generally involved ‘something more’ beyond the
marriage itself, and that this ‘something more’ is profoundly ‘other’ to the
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experience of a Western decision maker. The most recent of these is
Ngengwe, which involved the culturally distant practice of levirate
marriage.194 Likewise, in the 2007 Joseph decision, a woman from Pakistan
feared a forcible marriage on return and presented a narrative which
included violent attacks by her family and a history of so-called “honor
killings.”195 These cases all fit into the pattern of “othering” or
“exoticizing” women refugee claimants, presenting them as victims of
distant and backwards “traditional” cultural practices.
The tendency to exoticize gender claims is now well
documented,196 and FGM cases are the clearest example of this pattern.197
Indeed, even when the claimants explicitly linked their experience of FGM
to forced marriage, decision makers did not.198 Furthermore, in the
American cases, the practices of FGM are described in extraordinary,
almost prurient, detail. This is a striking distinction in comparison with the
cases involving FGM we reviewed from Australia, Canada and the United
Kingdom, and it adds considerably to the exoticization and othering of the
claimants. It was striking that the American cases did not ever analyze
forced marriage as a catalyst for other forms of forms of gendered harm;
this was so even when claims of FGM were closely linked to marriage.
Of the substantively positive decisions, two were written prior to
2001 when the combined effect of legislative and administrative changes in
the wake of the 9/11 attacks brought substantive changes to American law
in a much harsher climate for refugee claims.199 It is remarkable that the
oldest positive American decision in our data set, from 1994, comes
closest to defying an exoticizing pattern.200 The claim was brought by an
Iranian woman from a politically dissident family who faced coercion to
marry a disabled Iranian war veteran following the arrest and
disappearance of her husband.201 This decision of the Ninth Circuit
contains a strong statement that forcible marriage constitutes persecution in
certain circumstances: “There can be no doubt that a government that
coerces a woman to marry against her will on account of imputed political
194
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opinion has engaged in persecution.”202 While there were many factors
besides forced marriage involved in the case, the court engaged in
markedly less exoticising than is typical. Given our earlier discussion of
the myriad of problems in establishing particular social group parameters
in gender claims, it is worth noting that the strong analysis of forced
marriage as persecution in this case was not made on the basis of a
gendered particular social group but rather rested upon the political opinion
ground.203
In the international data set we found an understanding of “force”
in forced marriage that rested upon proxies for consent such as the level of
education, age, urbanity or “independence” of the applicant (with
independence itself represented by the proxies of income and
unaccompanied travel). Being educated, over the usual marriageable age
for the country of origin, residing in an urban rather than a rural area or
exhibiting “independence” through employment or past travel without
parental supervision were frequently taken to mean that female applicants
were not “disempowered” and thus could refuse marriage (and could also
therefore relocate away from any persecution or seek state protection).204
The approach of United States’ decision makers to understanding consent
was even narrower. In the American cases, proxies for consent comprised
only two factors: payment to another for the marriage and being a child.
For instance Gao, and the Second Circuit trio of cases decided in the “Gao
gap”205 (plus an earlier positive immigration judge decision concerning an
applicant from China) all involved the claimant being “sold” into marriage
as a minor or young woman through payment to family members or third
parties. In this way, the understanding of “force” in forced marriage
refugee claims came to resemble the very limited discourse around forced
marriage in American domestic politics, as concerning only child marriage
and human trafficking.206
Our canvass of the positive cases reinforces our conclusion that the
United States’ decision makers are far behind those in Australia, Canada
and the United Kingdom in terms of analyzing gender-related persecution.
In addition to not finding a single case with a straightforward holding that
forced marriage in and of itself could constitute persecution, we also did
not find any engagement with international human rights standards. Of the
few cases that were successful on a substantive basis, we found that the
underlying facts reflect an extreme exoticization of the women involved. It
is also astonishing that we found no gay men or lesbians among American
claimants, as they comprised a significant portion of our international data
set (with reasonably high success rates). Our conclusions about substantive
analysis in the United States cases are particularly distressing given that the
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procedural hurdles for claimants are far more onerous in the United States
than in Australia, Canada or the United Kingdom. Even if one is able to
surmount those hurdles, a claim that forcible marriage is a form of
persecution related to gender and sexuality appears to have little chance of
success in the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
In March 2009, Reem Al Numery of Yemen was recognized by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as one of eight “International Women of
Courage.”207 Along with women from Afghanistan, Guatemala, Iraq,
Malaysia, Niger, Russia and Uzbekistan, she was recognized for “courage
and leadership” in the struggle for “social justice and human rights.”208
Reem received this honour because of her fight against her own forced
marriage to a thirty-year old cousin when she was twelve years old.209
Bestowing this honour on Reem recognizes her as an individual, as
well as the circumstances of others like her—of the vulnerable group of
which she is a member. Yet, this recognition at the highest level of politics
and policy does not carry into asylum law. This finding parallels and
amplifies what we found in Britain, where a multilayered and highly
nuanced domestic debate about forced marriage largely failed to influence
refugee jurisprudence. In the United States the disjuncture between
domestic policy and asylum jurisprudence was even starker.
We found that despite the development of gender guidance by the
INS some fourteen years ago and despite ongoing commitment to training
around gender issues, there was a profound reluctance to accept any form
of broadly based gender group in asylum law, accompanied by
marginalization of all but the most extreme and exoticized forms of
gender-related harm (such as FGM). Although the issues of child marriage
and human trafficking have received considerable and increasing domestic
attention in the United States, even these forms of forced marriage were
rarely understood as persecutory harm in the United States’ asylum cases.
Our findings reflect the uneasy relationship between refugee law
and human rights law. Refugee law has not been able to fully embrace
human rights norms and unfolds against a floodgates fear, a persistent
cultural relativism and, in the United States more than any other country
we studied, a foreign policy ethos of exoticized harm elsewhere.
In the case of Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Court said of
marriage that it “fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection
that express our common humanity.”210 This description could as readily be
used to express the loftiest ideals of refugee law. Yet, when forced
marriage is claimed as harm in the refugee context, the notion of our
common humanity is unrecognizable. We began our investigation of forced
marriage as a basis of persecution because of our interest in exploring the
ways that gender and sexuality are understood in refugee law, expecting to
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find that analysis of these issues would have developed and become more
complex in recent years. It became evident through this study that refugee
jurisprudence in the United States is substantively impoverished as well as
procedurally hobbled, and the protection that it offers falls well short of
international standards and respect for our common humanity.
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